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ABSTRACT
The power-law distribution can be used to describe various aspects of social group
behavior. For mussels, sociobiological research has shown that the Levy walk best de
scribes their self-organizing movement strategy. A m ussel’s step length is drawn from a
power-law distribution, and its direction is drawn from a uniform distribution. In the area
of social networks, theories such as preferential attachment seek to explain why the degree
distribution tends to be scale-free. The aim o f this dissertation is to glean insight from these
works to help solve problems in two domains: cloud computing systems and community
detection.
Privacy and security are two areas o f concern for cloud systems. Recent research
has provided evidence indicating how a malicious user could perform co-residence profiling
and public to private IP mapping to target and exploit customers which share physical re
sources. This work proposes a defense strategy, in part inspired by mussel self-organization,
that relies on user account and workload clustering to mitigate co-residence profiling. To
obfuscate the public to private IP map, clusters are managed and accessed by account prox
ies. This work also describes a set of capabilities and attack paths an attacker needs to
execute for targeted co-residence, and presents arguments to show how the defense strat
egy disrupts the critical steps in the attack path for most cases. Further, it performs a risk
assessment to determine the likelihood an individual user will be victimized, given that a

successful non-directed exploit has occurred. Results suggest that while possible, this event
is highly unlikely.
As for community detection, several algorithms have been proposed. Most of these,
however, share similar disadvantages. Some algorithms require apriori information, such
as threshold values or the desired number o f communities, while others are computationally
expensive. A third category of algorithms suffer from a combination of the two. This work
proposes a greedy community detection heuristic which exploits the scale-free properties
of social networks. It hypothesizes that highly connected nodes, or hubs, form the basic
building blocks of communities. A detection technique that explores these characteristics
remains largely unexplored throughout recent literature. To show its effectiveness, the algo
rithm is tested on commonly used real network data sets. In most cases, it classifies nodes
into communities which coincide with their respective known structures. Unlike other im
plementations, the proposed heuristic is computationally inexpensive, deterministic, and
does not require apriori information.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Nature is one of life’s most fascinating mysteries. It is self-regulated, highly decen
tralized, and ever-evolving. Understanding how nature works may be the key to solving
some of m an’s most challenging research questions.

In recent years there has been a

growing interest in using interdisciplinary studies to investigate group behavior and the
underlying dynamics of within-group interactions.

Towards this end, researchers have

begun to explore social animals - populations of interacting individuals that operate in a
cooperative fashion to survive. Examples o f group activities include: foraging, nest build
ing, and group defense. Often times these interactions are asynchronous and decentralized
- exhibiting emergent properties, where basic communication and action on local scales
lead to complex phenomena on a global scale. Examples of emergent behavior include:
collective harvesting, flocking of birds, self-organization, standing ovations, and traffic
jams.
1.1 Research Questions
This research focuses on social groups from two different perspectives and seeks to
answer two fundamental questions.
1. From an insider’s perspective, in what ways do communities emerge? That is, what
internal processes have to occur on the micro-level to have group formation emerge
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on the macro-scale? Can mussels and Levy walks be used to describe these pro
cesses? How can this type of behavior be used as a defense strategy?
2. From an outsider’s perspective, how to detect communities once they have formed?
Given each individual’s local connections only, is it possible to classify individuals
into their respective known global communities? How can the scale-free properties
of social networks help shed light on this problem?

1.2 Limitations and Assumptions
The idea is to use insight gained from social group behavior to develop algorithms
and social simulations that are, in turn, used to help solve real world problems. However,
one well-known characteristic of this type o f approach is local convergence. Since individ
uals use peers within their vicinity to make decisions, this may lead to premature results local optima where local best is taken as global best. Though this phenom ena is inherent
for populations of interacting individuals, this research does present ways to mitigate its
occurrence.
For community detection, this work assumes non-overlapping communities - the
notion that a network can be divided into disjoint communities where each individual
belongs to one (and only one) group. However, in reality, it is quite possible for groups
to overlap where individuals belong to one o f several groups.

1.3 Dissertation Overview
This dissertation aims to use power-law properties of social groups to develop: a
defense strategy for cloud systems and a greedy heuristic for community detection. Chap
ter 2 introduces an aspect of the technical cloud framework used by the work done in
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Chapter 3. Among other things, it details the notion of using a proxy server to serve as
an intermediary between Internet users and multiple virtual machines. In light o f an attack
strategy recently described by researchers in [ 1J, Chapter 3 proposes a defense strategy, in
part inspired by mussel self-organization behavior. Chapter 4 presents a greedy heuristic
for community detection which exploits the scale-free nature of social networks. Lastly,
Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks and ideas for future directions.

CHAPTER 2
WEB FARM-INSPIRED CLOUD FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, we introduce a web farm-inspired framework for dynamic and
concurrent computational processing in the cloud. We compare and contrast this with the
Hadoop-cloud framework, discuss the main problems associated with our approach, and
give suggestions on ways to overcome said challenges. To implement the web-inspired
framework, we use Node.js - a lightweight, single threaded, server-side framework which
uses asynchronous callbacks to allow nondependent operations (parallel-like sections) to
execute while waiting for I/O events such as “fetching a file” or “writing a file to disk.”
We perform experiments to reveal two preliminary results that showcase the framework’s
functionality and scalability.
One, for non-blocking operations, worker nodes which use Node.js servers are
significantly faster than those which use traditional servers. In particular, a single Node.js
is (on average) 2.11 times faster than one Ruby Webrick server, and is (on average) 1.88
times faster than two Ruby Webrick servers. Two, we find that increasing the number of
worker nodes improves overall performance for blocking computational operations. As the
number o f worker nodes increases, the total execution time decreases exponentially and the
number of requests per second increases linearly.
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2.1 Introduction
Cloud computing has recently emerged as an information technology solution which
facilitates access to on-demand utility storage and computing services. Customers are
afforded the economy of scale at a low operational overhead. These features prove to
be especially advantageous to small companies which lack financial resources and physical
manpower. For larger companies, security and the privacy are more issues o f concern; so,
some organizations have developed private clouds, or even hybrid clouds, purposed to serve
internal communities and trusted constituents. Research communities have also considered
the cloud environment as a viable alternative platform for scientific workflows. Though
promising, the jury is still out on whether this technology marks the next generational shift
in platform of choice for low-cost computational processing and analysis [2—
4],
The Internet, on the other hand, has found a formula that works - a formula which
is efficient and highly scalable. This success is, in part, due to the way in which web
services are hosted. More often than not, they take the form of web server farms. These
farms are usually comprised o f three basic components: load balancer, web servers, and a
shared database server. The load balancer receives all the requests and forwards them to
the web servers according to some scheme, i.e., round robin, least connection, source. The
same content is duplicated on each server; so, it does not matter which server handles the
request. Since this is the case, all servers must use a shared database for storage. This type
of infrastructure grants websites the ability to accommodate the dynamic and bursty nature
(sudden and dramatic increase in requests) of web traffic.
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We would like to bring these types of concepts to the science domain. In particular,
we envision a web farm-like framework for dynamic and concurrent computational pro
cessing in the cloud - an approach which allows researchers to quickly build, configure,
and perform experiments using tools traditionally designed for web applications.

For

web services, developers create and deploy web applications to hypertext transfer protocol
(HTTP) web servers which, in turn, receive, process, and deliver web content. We propose
a similar framework whereby researchers develop and deploy computational applications
to compute servers which, in turn, receive computational tasks (via representational state
transfer (RESTful) requests over HTTP), perform computations, and deliver science prod
ucts.
With this, researchers will have the freedom to work on either a system level, an
application level, or both. Working on a system level gives one direct control over the
infrastructure, i.e., the interface to computational services, the job routing scheme, the
total number of nodes, the number of compute servers per worker node, etc. On the other
hand, the application level is more concerned with developing the computational algorithm,
which will be deployed as a job to run on the system - what executes, how it executes, and
the resources it requires. There are several reasons why this framework would be beneficial.
One, the basic infrastructure for communication between heterogeneous-roled components
already exists. Two, most of the tools for infrastructural development, experimentation, and
analysis are freely available (open-source), widely used, and rigorously tested. Three, this
“building on existing web components approach” provides an infrastructural abstraction,
and allows the researcher to focus on the algorithm itself, thereby increasing developer
productivity.
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There are a number of other frameworks which leverage distributed resources for
computational processing, i.e., Hadoop [5] with M apReduce [6], Pegasus [7], Swift [8j,
SAGA [9], Condor [10], etc. However, the current state o f the art does not easily lend itself
to the degree of flexibility we require. Our ultimate goal is to dynamically upload and pro
cess custom web coverage processing service (W CPS) [11] algorithms on heterogeneous
platforms. Platforms of interest include: cloud, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), satellites,
etc. In most o f these cases, the upload bandwidth will be extremely limited. Implementing
the framework on the cloud provides a basic proof of concept. We later plan to expand the
implementation to other platforms.
This chapter presents a web farm-inspired framework for dynamic computational
processing in the cloud. It is divided into eight sections. Section 2.2 compares and con
trasts this approach with Hadoop-cloud framework. Section 2.4 presents and explains the
web farm-inspired design, and goes into detail about the Node.js framework. Section 2.5
describes the cloud services we use, and provides a general overview on our approach
toward implementing the web farm-inspired framework. Section 2.6 conducts experiments
(for blocking and nonblocking operations) to reveal preliminary results which showcase
the framework’s functionality and scalability. Section 2.7 reviews the results, discusses
the challenges associated with this approach, and identifies ways in which they can be
overcome. Finally, Section 2.8 provides concluding remarks.

2.2 Hadoop-Cloud Framework
Most existing distributed application frameworks (i.e., Hadoop) are designed to
handle large data processing jobs in a static batch-like fashion. W hen combined with a
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web service such as Amazon Elastic MapReduce [12], compute nodes could be provisioned
on-demand to complete the job as fast as possible. To do this, individual nodes have to be
assigned individual tasks in a coordinated and organized manner. Once each node receives
and completes its respective task, each result must be collected. This is accomplished via
MapReduce. Here, a one (master) to many (workers) relationship is assumed. Furthermore,
there are two distinct phases: Map and Reduce. In the Map phase, the master node splits the
big job into smaller tasks and assigns them to available worker nodes. In the Reduce phase,
the master collects all the individual results and combines them in such a way to generate
the desired overall output. Additionally, there is a distributed file system for scalability,
data reliability, and fault tolerance.
The Hadoop approach caters specifically to big jobs; or small jobs which have been
bundled together to form big jobs. Either way, the processing engine will not be able to
process any new job until the current job has been completed. Thus, while processing, there
are two ways to handle dynamic requests:
1. Option One:
(a) Reject them OR
2. Option Two:
(a) Collect requests
(b) Form batch jobs which consists of many requests
(c) Queue batch jobs (first in, first out (FTFO) default) or use custom schedulers,
i.e., CloudBATCH [13]
(d) Process batch jobs (when available)
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If we choose Option Two, we would have to determine whether all batch jobs should be
heterogeneous or homogeneous in size. If jobs are homogeneous, then problems could
arise in a situation where the demand goes down and there are not enough requests to make
a standard job. Perhaps determining an efficient “jo b padding” technique should suffice. If,
on the other hand, jobs are heterogeneous, a priority scheduling scheme would be needed
to prevent small jobs from being processed at the mercy of large jobs. As such, scheduling
this many (big jobs) to one (processing cluster) computational paradigm may not be the
best approach when processing smaller sized job requests (<C Hadoop job), i.e., requests
made via web.
As it stands, there is no standard framework to handle dynamic computational
requests. Usually, researchers have to build the infrastructure from the ground up [14].
Towards this end, we propose web farm-inspired computational cluster.

2.3 Related Research
Existing research to date primarily focuses on pleasingly parallel scientific applica
tion dataflows with large datasets. This is attractive because it caters to two strengths of
the cloud computing paradigm: on-demand scalability and minimal to no communication
between compute nodes. Below, we give a few examples.
Wall et al. implemented reciprocal smallest distance (RSD), a comparative genetics
algorithm, using Amazon’s Elastic Computing Cloud (EC2). They executed approximately
300,000 tasks on 100 high capacity compute node in about 70 hours at a cost of $6,302
USD [15]. Zhang et al. [16] use Hadoop to develop a cloud application which processes
sequences of microscopic images of live cells. They conclude that “Hadoop allows to speed
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up calculations by a factor that equals the num ber o f compute nodes.” Vecchiola, Pandey,
and Buyya use Aneka, a cloud computing solution, to classify gene expression and execute
an fMRI brain imaging algorithm [17J. From their findings, they state:

large high

performance applications can benefit from on-demand access and scalability of compute
and storage resources provided by public Clouds.” Lu, Jackson, and Barga [14] seek
implement the AzureBLAST, their parallel version of the Basic Local Alignment Search
Tool (BLAST) algorithm, on Windows Azure. In regards to the scalability o f their design,
they report: “ ... the throughput of AzureBlast increases almost linearly when given more
instances.” They also find that the read throughput of the Azure blob storage increases with
the number of instances. Lastly, Gunarathne et al. deploy pleasingly parallel biomedical
applications to the cloud environment [18]. They maintain that “cloud infrastructure based
models as well as the Map Reduce based frameworks offered very good parallel efficiencies
given sufficiently coarser grain task decompositions.”
From reviewing those above as well as others not presented here [19-21], we
conclude that application-specific algorithmic development is a non-trivial task. Issues such
as overall system architecture, job partitioning and allocation, inter-node communication,
etc. must be addressed. The approach to these issues may vary significantly from one
application to the next. Thus, developers should be well-versed and familiarized with the
application itself and the inner-workings o f the cloud environment, as naive implementa
tions usually will not render impressive results.

11

2.4 Web Farm-Inspired Framework
2.4.1 Assumptions
Before we go into the details of the system design, we feel it is appropriate to
point out our assumptions. First, we take nodes to be representative o f virtual machines
(VMs); and we also take algorithms to be representative of computational kernels. We
use these terms interchangeably. Second, users submit jobs asynchronously via some web
application. However, when testing to find the limitations of the system, the worst case
scenario is assumed - all users submit jobs simultaneously. Third, the system adopts a one
master to many workers distributed paradigm, whereby the master ONLY distributes jobs
to multiple worker nodes. Fourth, individual jobs are independent of each other, execute
on one worker node, and do not need to be partitioned. Given this, there is no need for
MapReduce. Fifth, the master uses some scheduling technique to distribute jobs, i.e., roundrobin, least connections, source, etc. Sixth, we assume a NO SHARE architecture. This
means that there is no inter-worker node communication or inter-worker node dependencies.
Seventh, if a worker node receives new jobs while it is processing, it simply queues and
processes them in a FIFO fashion (when available).

2.4.2 System-Level Components
As shown in Figure 2.1, the design contains the same basic components one would
expect to find in a traditional web farm. Here, the master HAProxy (22] node distributes
(load balance) jobs to worker nodes. Each worker contains a compute server which wraps
some computational kernel.

HAProxy provides a password protected web status page

which allows system administrators to view how jobs are being distributed across the
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worker nodes. Monit [23] monitors (stop, start, restart) critical processes, files, devices,
and remote systems. It also provides a password protected http interface which allows one
to monitor the system(s) via a web browser. Node.js [24] presents a server-side framework
which we use to build scalable networked compute servers. We discuss Node.js in detail
later. ApacheBench [25] (not shown) benchmarks the system’s raw performance; and it
generates a summary report which contains important measurements and statistics such as
achieved throughput (requests/second) and total execution time.

COMPUTATIONAL

HTTP REQUESTS

:o m p u t e
KERNEL

Figure 2.1: Web farm-inspired system design

As mentioned, there are multiple http services that need to be accessed: H A Proxy’s
status page, M onit’s system monitor, and the compute cluster itself. To only use one
uniform resource locator (URL), we take advantage of HAProxy’s access control list (ACL)
feature. This allows us to use HAProxy to make decisions based off of information ex
tracted from the uniform resource name (URN). In particular, we define rules such that
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HAProxy routes requests to different server pools depending on the URN. Thus, a request
can mean “fetch a status page” or “submit a job to the compute cluster.” In our setup, as
shown in Figure 2.2, a request which ends in “/” is taken to be a job and is load balanced
across the compute servers; “/haproxy-stats” is directed to the HAProxy web status page;
and “/monit” is routed to the Monit http interface to view the health of the system. To
improve the system’s fault tolerance, Heartbeat [26] and an additional backup HAProxy
master node can be introduced for failover and failback. Since the Node.js server plays
a crucial role in the system design, we now turn to: describe the framework in detail,
elaborate on the properties which make the assignments to it more advantageous (when
compared to more traditional servers), and explain its role in job processing.

• Route to:
•Http Compute Servers

/m on it
/haproxystats

•Route to:
•System Status

•Route to:
•HAProxy Status

Figure 2.2: HAProxy ACL

2.4.3 Node.js
Our design calls for a lightweight server-side framework which acts as a simple
I/O wrapper - a middleman which sits between HAProxy (the request dispenser) and the
computational kernel (the job to be performed). In particular, its role is to receive requests,
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parse them into inputs, and appropriate the inputs to the desired computational kernel.
Though somewhat non-traditional, the focus here is to use a simple framework for I/O
rather than employ a full stack web application framework. Node.js is an evented I/O
server-side framework (built on top of G oogle’s V8 JavaScript Engine [27]) which runs a
single thread in an evented loop. To keep the loop from blocking, it uses asynchronous
callbacks for input/output (I/O).
There are three advantages to using Node.js. First, it adheres to our requirements.
It a lightweight framework which specializes in I/O. Second, asynchronous callbacks allow
nondependent operations (parallel-like sections) to execute while waiting for I/O events
such as “fetching a file” or “writing a file to disk.” This is in direct contrast with the nature
of traditional http servers (and serial programs in general) which execute commands in a
linear, top-down, fashion. The main argument here is that CPU cycles are wasted, espe
cially for I/O operations, because non-dependent commands do nothing since commands
are executed sequentially. Third, is the difference in the number of threads used to handle
multiple connections. Node.js is single threaded. However, it executes callbacks to accept
and possibly service multiple requests in parallel. The caveat here is that one non-blocking
service operation blocks all servicing operations from other requests. Traditional servers,
on the other hand, create a new thread for each accepted request. Hence, they are called
multi-threaded servers. In Section 2.5, we implement the web farm-inspired framework;
then in Section 2.6 we observe and analyze the performance for both blocking and nonblocking operations. However, next, we discuss what a jo b is, how it is formed, and how it
is handled once it is distributed to a compute server.
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2.4.4 Job Submission & Processing
We take a job to be a request for some type of computational processing. To make
a request, users will either select from existing algorithms in the database or upload a new
custom algorithm (which will be added to the database). A custom algorithm must be
written according to some agreed standard. The actual details of this standard is beyond
the scope of this chapter. Nonetheless, users will also have to provide the necessary inputs
which correspond to the selected algorithm. Once done, the request or “jo b ” will be sent
to a worker node via HAProxy. Algorithm 1 gives a general idea of how a compute server
handles a job request. Each worker node has at least one compute server which listens for
jobs on some specified port (line 9). Once a job arrives, the server immediately accepts it.
When ready, the server begins to process the job by storing the input data to a local variable
(line 3). Next, it parses that variable and passes the parameters to the execution function
(lines 4-6). The execution function, as indicated by the constructor call (line 1), executes
the request when given the necessary parameters (line 7). Once the request is fulfilled, the
connection terminates (line 8).

Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for node.js compute server
1 execute -f—new job() ;
createSERVER
3
parameters <— receiveDATAQ ;
4
data <— stringTokenize(parameters) ;
5
input
data [0] ;
6
algorithm <— data [ l j ;
7
execute.run(algorithm, input) ;
8
end connection ;

2

9 listen (port, IP address) ;
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2.5 Cloud Description and Setup
To realize the web farm-inspired framework, we require the cloud infrastructure
as a service (IaaS) paradigm. The model we use, in particular, is made accessible via
the Eucalyptus [28] application program interface (API). This API grants the ability to
provision, configure, manage, or deprovision VM instances - as needed.

In terms of

specifications, each VM uses CentOS 5.5 (version 2.6.32-5-amd64) [29], has 15 GB of
memory and 19 GB of storage space, and is mounted with 42 TB of shared storage.
We now give a general overview on our approach toward implementing the web
farm-inspired framework. The experiments we will run (in this chapter), at most, require
11 VMs: one master node and up to 10 worker nodes. Instead of deploying all 11 nodes at
once, we start by deploying one node and configuring its environment with all the necessary
software components, i.e., HAProxy, Monit, Node.js, etc. Once done, we create an image
of the running instance, and use the Eucalyptus API to bundle the image, upload the bundle,
and register the image. Now that we have a base image, we deploy 10 additional VMs.
Regardless the role, each VM uses the same image.
We use screen [30] to multiplex the terminal so that we can secure shell (ssh) [31 ]
into each VM. Since we use a private cloud, each VM has a private internet protocol (IP)
address which takes the form of 10.101.10.- -. We take the VM the lowest IP address
to be the master node, and all the other nodes to be workers. We configure HAProxy
on the master node and create a server pool consisting of the IPrPORT of each compute
server which will run on the worker nodes. Next, we develop the both Node.js server and
the computational function which executes the jo b and deploy them to the worker nodes
(discussed in Section 2.6). We then start the compute servers on the ports as indicated in the
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HAProxy configuration file. All workers are now ready to receive and process jobs. Next,
we start HAProxy on the master node, and now it is ready to receive requests and distribute
them to the compute servers, which execute on their respective worker nodes.

2.6 Experiments and Preliminary Results
In this section, we do experiments to reveal preliminary results which showcase the
framework’s functionality and scalability. Towards this end, our immediate objective is to
implement the web farm-inspired framework and assess its overall performance for both
blocking and nonblocking operations. We covered most o f the general framework imple
mentation in the prior section. So, here (in addition to assessing performance) we devote
some attention to discussing both the blocking and non-blocking jobs which execute within
their respective Node.js servers. Also, we do not implement the front-end web application
interface for end-users. To test this framework, we instead vary one o f two parameters either vary the number o f job requests or the number of VMs. We use Apachebench to
vary the number of concurrent requests - parameter one. As aforementioned, HAProxy
receives the requests and distributes them to the worker nodes. We modify HAProxy’s
configuration file to vary the number of VMs to which it routes requests - parameter two;
and use HAProxy’s status page to confirm that Apachebench did send the desired amount
of requests.

2.6.1 Non-Blocking Operation
For the non-blocking experiment, we imagine a scenario where users submit jobs
which perform some I/O operation. Let’s say that the operation is to fetch large files, and the
time required to fetch each file is 10 seconds. Given this, we want to observe the overall
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task completion time given a certain amount of concurrent requests. So, for example, if
we have 20 users that each submit a request simultaneously, we expect the overall task
completion time to be about 200 seconds (at the very worst). A traditional single-threaded
server which accepts requests, queues and fetches files in a FIFO fashion would mostly
likely give these results. A natural question which comes to mind is: how do both the
Node.js server and a traditional multi-threaded server fare in this situation?
To answer this question, we implement a Ruby Webrick server (adapted from [32])
and a Node.js (adapted from [33]). We use a 10 second timeout function to simulate
the act of “fetching a file.” This means that for each request, each server waits for 10
seconds and delivers a “job completed” message at the end o f the waiting period. Though
theoretically the same, each implementation is fundamentally different in approach. The
Ruby Webrick approach, as shown in Algorithms 2, is straightforward. The server accepts
requests, “fetches a file” (sleeps for 10 seconds), then responds.

Algorithm 2: Ruby webrick, fetch file
class
Timeout ;
define
3
call(env);
4
5
sleep 10;
return {200, ; {Content-Type = > text/plain},
6
7
{“The timeout function has completed” }} ;
i

2

8 run Timeout.new ;

The Node.js implementation (Algorithm 3), on the other hand, is not as intuitive.
So let us describe this in a bit of detail. Node.js is evented. This means that a sequence of
events direct the nature of the program. Thus, in lines 1-4, we write a sleep function such
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that it creates an event when the timeout expires. The function, in particular, ingests a status
parameter and passes it to the callback function. Since we set the timeout value to 10000
milliseconds, the callback function fires when the timeout value expires after 10 seconds.
The server is implemented in lines 5-9. There is a listener, on line 9, which triggers lines
6-9 every time a request is made. Lines 6-9 execute sequentially. Line 6 sends an “OK,
request received” response. On line 7, we pass a “completed” status to the sleep function.
After 10 seconds, an event fires and line 8 executes. Line 8, gives a “request completion”
response and closes the connection. As for the order of events, when the server starts,
the print statement on line 10 executes immediately. If we use Apachebench to send IV
concurrent requests, the listener on line 9 detects N requests. In response to this, all N
requests are accepted. Next, the server executes line 6 in parallel for each request, then line
7 (in parallel), and lastly line 8 (in parallel).

Algorithm 3: Node.js, fetch file
1 sleep
2
sleep <— function(data, callb ack );
3
var timeout <— 10000 ;
4
setTimeout(function(){callback(null, data)}, tim e o u t);
5

6
7
8
9

createSERVER
function(request, resp o n d );
respond.writeHead(200, {Content-Type: text/plain }) ;
sleep(“completed”, function(err, data){ ;
respond.end(“The timeout function has: ” + data)}) ;

listen(3000, 127.0.0.1);
11 console.log(Server running at h ttp ://l27.0.0.1:3000/) ;

10

Using the web farm approach, we setup one worker node with one Node.js server.
We then use Apachebench to vary the num ber of concurrent requests from 20 to 500, and
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observe the performance. The results, shown in Figure 2.3, are as expected. The average
total execution time 10.28 seconds. Next, we repeat the same experiment with one Webrick
server. Again, the results are as expected. The Webrick server does not fare as well. The
average execution time here is 21.74 seconds. This means that one Node.js sever is on
average 2.11 times faster. We try to experiment again using two Webrick servers. The
results improve slightly. This time the average execution time is 19.24 seconds. Thus, a
single Node.js server is on average 1.88 faster than two Webrick servers. Notice that each
experiment in Figure 2.3 follows a similar trend. The total execution time increases from
20 to 100 concurrent requests, decreases from 100 to 200, and begins to increase again
from 300 to 500.
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Figure 2.3: Single node.js outperforms multi-threaded webrick servers for non-blocking
operations.

What happens if we actually replace the timeout function with an actual com
putation?

How would the overall system perform?

If the computation is a blocking
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operation, can we increase the number of servers to improve performance? We entertain
these questions next.

2.6.2 Blocking Operation
In this experiment, we build on the contrived example above by replacing the “wait
statement” with an actual computation. O ur goal is to determine whether adding worker
nodes to the web farm-inspired compute cluster lead to improved performance for blocking
computations.

We decide to embed a normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI)

algorithm within the Node.js compute server, as indicated in Algorithm 4. The flow of
this program is similar to that described earlier (Algorithm 1). Thus, we will not go into as
much detail.

Algorithm 4: Node.js, perform NDVI
1 var sys 4— req u ire(sys) ;
2

var http

require(http) ;

3 jo b
require(./job) ;
4 varrunJO B <— new job .R u n tim eE n g in e() ;
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

13

createSERVER
(function(request, respond) ;
respond.writeHead(200, {Content-Type: text/plain}) ;
respond.write(Please Wait) ;
runJOB.execute(“am sJlg m d v L p n g ” , “AMS. 19nov09.16.3^47” , 0) ;
runJOB.addListener(result, function(result)) ;
foreach v a r a ttr in resu lt do
L sys.puts(attr + “ : ” + result(attr));
respond.end(“Completed”) ;

14 listen(3000, 127.0.0.1) ;

Nonetheless, lines 1-4 include a few libraries. Line 4, in particular, is a custom
built library which has functions related to job execution. The nature of the library itself is
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beyond the scope of this discussion. Lines 6-7 sends a response to the client once a request
is detected in line 15. Line 8 accepts three parameters: the NDVI algorithm, the image,
and a cache option. The cache option simply checks the database to determine whether
or not the results already exist for this algorithm/image combination. Setting this value to
one, turns the option on; and setting this value to zero, turns the option off. We want this
option off for testing purposes; so we set the value to zero. Lines 10-13 listens for the
result from each of the three image bands and outputs the result. Once done, line 14 sends
a “completed status” and closes the connection. The main thing to note here is this is not an
170 or non-blocking operation. Thus, the computation blocks all other computations from
executing in parallel.
Since image processing, in general, can be computationally intensive, we determine
that there should only be one compute server per worker node and that each worker node
would have the same compute server. So, for example, 10 worker nodes mean 10 duplicate
Node.js http servers. In order to establish some baseline for performance, we take all the
jobs to be the same. This means that all jobs executes the same NDVI algorithm on the
same image. Next, we use Apachebench to simulate an arbitrary number of concurrent
computational job requests (we choose 20). HAProxy then receives and distributes the
requests to worker nodes in a round-robin fashion. We form 10 test cases by varying the
cluster size from one to 10 worker nodes and observe the overall system performance.
Again, this time, instead of waiting, each Node.js compute server responds to a
request by executing the algorithm. In the previous example, each test case executed the
concurrent requests (from 20 up to 500) in approximately 10 seconds, the time it took to
execute one single request. This let us know that the concurrent requests were accepted and
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processed in parallel. The operations did not block the single Node.js thread. However, in
this example, our initial observation is as expected. Node.js blocks while executing a single
request, but instead of rejecting, each worker node queues subsequent requests if received
while processing. Below, we indicate how we deduce this.
One computation takes approximately 5.51 seconds to complete. Instead o f taking
close to 5.51 seconds to accept and execute 20 duplicate concurrent computational requests,
it takes 88.94 seconds (for one worker node). This means that each computation takes about
4.45 seconds (on average), and that each request blocks the evented thread and prevent
other requests from being executed. To ensure that the thread is indeed blocked due to the
computation (as opposed to the problem being the same jobs waiting for the same resources
- not a blocked thread), we compose another simple function. If the function executes after
the computation, this would indicate that the computation blocks the thread. If the function
executes concurrently with the computation, this would indicate that the computation did
not block the thread. The results indicate the former. The function did not execute until
after the computation. The good news is, in spite o f this, the compute servers accept and
queue the requests and execute them in a FIFO manner.
Given that the computation blocks the thread, the only way to improve the overall
performance is to increase the number of threads (or the number o f Node.js servers). Since
we limit each worker node to 1 compute server, we have to increase the number of worker
nodes. By varying the number of worker nodes from one to 10, the overall performance
does improve.
The results are shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. The total execution time decreases
exponentially, and the number of requests/second increase linearly as the number of worker
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nodes increase. Also, in both Figures 2.4 and 2.5, notice that the results for test cases six
and nine (number of virtual machines) deviate slightly from the trend, as suggested by
the other test cases. The result for these two cases is slightly higher than what the trend
suggests in Figure 2.4, and is slightly lower than what the trend suggests in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.4: For blocking operations, the total execution tim e decreases exponentially as the
number of VMs increase.
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Figure 2.5: For blocking operations, the number of requests/second increases linearly as
the number of VMs increase.
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2.7 Discussion
In the last section, we claim that the total execution time decreases exponentially
and the requests/second increase linearly as the number o f VMs (or worker nodes) increase.
However, this conclusion is just an initial assessment based on the trend that the data
suggests. To test our hypothesis, we make a scatter plot o f the data, and fit an exponential
and linear curve to their respective graphs. As shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.7, each curve
fits well. The R 2 for the exponential fit is 0.87. Notice, in Figure 2.6, that one VM has a
total execution time of about 89 seconds, and two VMs have a total execution time o f about
44 seconds. Clearly, two VMs perform twice as good as one. However, the big disparity
in these two results most likely explains why the R 2 value is slightly below 90%. The

R 2 value for the linear fit is 0.97. Thus, we can say that these results provide supporting
evidence in favor of our hypothesis.
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Figure 2.6: Exponential curve fitting for the total execution time
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Figure 2.7: Linear curve fitting for the number of requests/second
Moving forward, we now discuss the inherent challenges associated with using
the web farm-inspired framework for computational processing, and give suggestions re
searchers should consider when mapping computational kernels using this approach. Web
farms, and the tools associated with them, are designed to serve lightweight requests which
can be executed on the order of milliseconds to seconds. Computational processing, on the
other hand, can be compute and time intensive. Given this, developers should seek to min
imize communication and the number of compute servers per worker node (servers/node).
In regards to communication, the best thing to do is to follow the web farm approach:
maintain uni-directional communication from master node to worker nodes and have NO
communication among worker nodes. To ensure no inter-worker node communication, use
problems which are pleasingly parallel.
The number of worker nodes and the server/node ratio together determine the num
ber of requests the system can handle in parallel. To handle more concurrent blocking
computational requests, simply add more worker nodes. Like a web farm, each worker node
can support multiple compute servers; but since the computational kernel may command
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significant resources, researchers should look to keep the number of servers/node to a
minimum. However, in general, the resource requirements of each computational request
and the anticipated peak request traffic will be the determining factors in choosing the
server/node ratio and the necessary number of worker nodes. Also, try to keep in mind
that there is an inverse relationship between the number o f servers/node and the number
of worker nodes. A decrease in the server/node ratio means an increase in the number of
worker nodes.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a web farm-inspired infrastructure for dynamic and
concurrent computational processing in the cloud. We described this framework in detail
and gave reasons as to why, and under what circumstances, it proves beneficial. We did
experiments to reveal two preliminary results which showcased the framework’s function
ality and scalability. The first result showed that, for non-blocking operations, worker
nodes which use Node.js servers are significantly faster than those which use traditional
servers; and from the second result we concluded that, increasing the number of worker
nodes improves the overall system performance for blocking computational operations.

2.9 Using Proxies for Cloud Security
The framework presented in the this chapter mostly centered on the use of a proxy.
One important property of proxies is the ability to maintain 1-to-?; mappings between
clients and servers.

In the next chapter, we couple the idea of proxies with the self

organizing behavior of mussels to develop a cloud defense strategy. This strategy addresses
a vulnerability which exploits a 1-to-l public to private IP mapping.

CHAPTER 3
MUSSELS, LEVY WALKS, AND CLOUD SECURITY
Recent research has provided evidence indicating how a malicious user could per
form co-residence profiling and public to private IP mapping to target and exploit customers
which share physical resources. The attacks rely on two steps: resource placement on the
target’s physical machine and extraction. O ur proposed solution, in part inspired by mussel
self-organization, relies on user account and workload clustering to mitigate co-residence
profiling. Users with similar preferences and workload characteristics are mapped to the
same cluster. To obfuscate the public to private IP map, each cluster is managed and
accessed by an account proxy. Each proxy uses one public IP address, which is shared by
all clustered users when accessing their instances, and maintains the mapping to private IP
addresses. We describe a set of capabilities and attack paths an attacker needs to execute for
targeted co-residence, and present arguments to show how our approach disrupts the critical
steps in the attack path for most cases. We then perform a risk assessment to determine the
likelihood an individual user will be victimized, given that a successful non-directed exploit
has occurred. Our results suggest that while possible, this event is highly unlikely.

3.1 Introduction
Equipped with the ability to leverage virtual resources on-demand, cloud computing
systems have recently emerged as a viable low-cost alternative to traditional computing
28
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platforms. This has sparked widespread interest, adoption, and/or research initiatives from
all institutions alike (e.g., academic, industrial, government, etc.), which in turn, has led
to myriads of success stories [34-36] that give credence to its potential and effectiveness.
Though promising, this technology suffers from the same fate as any other new develop
ment in its infancy stage. It solves some problems while newly introducing unanticipated
and not readily understood challenges [37]. At the core o f these concerns lies privacy and
security [38^-2]. Recent research [1] has shown that it is possible to identify and target a
cloud user, launch malicious virtual machines (VMs) which perform co-residence checks,
and possibly extract confidential information once co-residency with the victim has been
established. An example such as this exposes the volatility o f cloud security.
To gain insight on how to best solve this problem, we look towards nature - for
research shows that social animals have the tendency to solve distributed problems (e.g.,
foraging, nest building, defense) optimally, robustly, and efficiently [43-47], Similar to
how mussels form small clusters to decrease water stress and minimize the risk of preda
tion [48-52], we hypothesize that cloud providers can strategically cluster users to mitigate
the chance o f targeted exploits via malicious co-resident users. The general idea o f using
clustering to address security vulnerabilities is expressed in various works [53-56]. How
ever, these mostly use mix networks. We briefly consider one example. In [54], Reiter and
Rubin create a system to conceal the identity o f clients when performing web transactions.
This system is based on the notion of crowd blending and “operates by grouping users into
large and geographically diverse groups that collectively issues requests on behalf of its
members.”
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In this work, we propose a framework where the cloud provider uses mussel behav
ior to cluster users according to individual preferences, e.g., computational requirements
(small, medium, or large VM), workflow duration (hours, days, weeks), or cluster size
(small, medium, large). Each cluster contains members with similar preferences or work
load types - subscribed in a best effort manner. This means that assignment to the cluster
which exactly matches user preferences is not always guaranteed. To obfuscate the public to
private IP map, each cluster is managed and accessed by an account proxy. Each proxy uses
one public IP address, which is shared by all clustered users when accessing their instances,
and maintains the mapping to private IP addresses. To prevent attacks aimed at users
belonging to a particular proxy, clusters periodically dissolve. That is to say, on occasion,
members are disbanded and are subscribed to new clusters. If an individual’s preferences
have not changed, then the new cluster will be similar to the prior cluster. Otherwise,
the new cluster will reflect the individual’s new interests. The period of updates is a user
defined parameter. Thus, preference is used to determine how often clusters dissolve e.g.
(hours, days, weeks).
The rest of this chapter is organized into seven sections.

Section 3.2 gives the

contributions of this chapter. Section 3.3 presents the system model, threat model, and
the exploit description. Section 3.4 provides a brief background on mussel behavior, and
details how we make mathematic and algorithmic modifications to a model which describes
density-dependent interactions between individual mussels. Section 3.5 covers the techni
cal aspects of our proposed solution. Section 3.6 performs a risk assessment to determine
the likelihood an individual user will be victimized, given that a successful non-directed
exploit has occurred; and lastly, Section 3.7 yields concluding remarks.
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3.2 Contributions
Ristenpart et al. conduct research which uncovers security vulnerabilities in the
cloud. They use standard network probing tools to decode the 1-to -1 public to private
IP map, and use this map to identify and target other cloud users. Next, they conduct
experiments and find that the private IP addresses are statically assigned according to
launch parameters - availability zone and instance type. They then use the same launch
parameters as that of the victim to maximize the chance of co-resident placement. Each VM
performs co-residence checks to determine whether it shares the same physical machine as
its victim. If not, it terminates. Otherwise, it proceeds with extraction - the next phase of
the attack. This is the nature of the adversarial model we consider.
This chapter, on the other hand, firstly introduces a defensive mussel- inspired
strategy to address cloud vulnerabilities. We obfuscate public to private IP mapping by
having account proxies perform 1-to-n random mapping o f public to private IP addresses.
This decreases the risk of adversary targeting and significantly reduces the amount of
public IP addresses needed for users to access their VM instances. By having clusters
periodically dissolve, our strategy decreases the chances o f directed attacks towards random
users belonging to a particular account proxy. Lastly, our approach takes advantage of
the cloud’s intrinsic features. VM instantiations are inherently transient. Even with co
residency and a successful breach, the victimized VM can be terminated at any time,
only to be redeployed later - possibly to another physical machine. This feature coupled
with account proxies helps prevent a user from being consistently targeted, tracked, and
victimized across multiple physical machines.
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3.3 System Model, Threat M odel, and Exploit Description
Cloud computing systems provide innovative solutions while introducing new av
enues for research direction. One aspect o f cloud systems which serves in this capacity
is hardware virtualization - the ability for multiple customers to share the same physical
resources at the same time. Though providers benefit from resource consolidation, this
feature poses new security challenges and possibly serves as a significant system vulner
ability. Consider two competing organizations which both lease resources from the same
cloud provider. It is foreseeable that one custom er’s motive could consist of exploiting the
shared nature of the cloud to identify, target, and victimize its competitor. Possible attacks
could include: monitoring workflow patterns, extracting valuable information, conducting
denial of service (DoS), distributed DoS (DDoS), or EDoS (Economic Denial o f Service),
where the victim ’s bill causes a shock at the end of the accounting period because they have
had to use more instances than planned. Given this, we consider custom er VMs, data, and
information to be assets.

3.3.1 System and Threat Model
From a system model perspective, we classify customers based on intent. Malicious

users are those with malevolent intent - those who target other users and seek physical
machine co-residence for unauthorized surveillance and/or data extraction o f via certain
exploits, i.e., side channel attacks. We consider these type of users to be threats which
launch attacks comprised of two steps: virtual machine placement on the machine upon
which the target resides and data extraction. Below, we identify four types o f attackers and
list the possible goals for each.
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1. Eavesdropping non-directed attacker goal is to read data or find out about any target.
2. Malicious non-directed attacker goal is to cause a DoS on any or all instances.
3. Eavesdropping directed attacker goal is to get data from a specific com petitor’s
instance or learn about their workload pattern.
4. Malicious directed attacker goal is to cause one of the following attacks on a partic
ular target: DoS, DDos, or EDoS.

Honest users, on the contrary, are those that use cloud resources for their intended
purposes. These users have sincere intent. They abide by the protocols, procedures, and
regulations as outlined in the terms of service agreement. We would like to prevent these
users from being identified and targeted by malicious users. A peer is simply one that
shares the same physical resources - a co-resident user. A peer can either be a malicious or
honest user. We assume the cloud provider to be trusted and honest - providing the services
to its customers as outlined in the service license agreement.

3.3.2 Exploit Description
Since the inception of cloud services, the possibility of users being exploited by
a rogue peer has always been a major issue of concern.

However, the realization of

these fears never quite materialized until researchers began to uncover the extent of cloud
user vulnerability. The exploit we consider is described by Ristenpart et al. In [ 1J, they
use Amazon’s EC2 [57J “ as a case study to demonstrate that careful empirical mapping
can reveal how to launch VMs in a way that maximizes the likelihood o f advantageous
placement.” To investigate this notion, they assume a placement and extraction attack
strategy. They use domain name system (DNS) resolution queries and traditional network
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tools, i.e., nmap, hping, wget, to determine the external name of an instance and to derive a
map which exposes the correlation between the external public IP address and the internal
private IP address of an instance. They additionally found that the internal IP addresses are
statically assigned to physical machines according to availability zone and instance type.
Thus, the map could be used to deduce the availability zone and instance type for any given
target - effectively reducing both the search space for finding a target and the number of
“probe instances” needed to be deployed before achieving co-residence. A probe instance
is simply a malicious VM that performs a co-residence check to determine whether or not
a target is a peer. If the target is a peer, it proceeds with data extraction - the next phase of
the attack. Otherwise, it terminates.
Ristenpart et al. identify three different methods which could be used to determine
co-residence, and present two strategies an attacker could use to exploit placem ent in EC2
- brute-forcing placement and placement locality. The brute-forcing placement strategy
deploys a large number of instances over time in same zone and o f the same type as that of
the instances belonging to a large target set. They conduct an experiment using this strategy
and receive a success rate of 8.4%. This means that 8.4% of the probe instances actually
achieved co-residence with instances of the target set. The placement locality strategy,
on the other hand, assumes a smaller target set, and also presumes that the attacker can
launch probe instance soon after a targeted victim ’s instances are launched. They conduct
another experiment, and find that this strategy yields a success rate of 40%. They make the
following conclusions concerning Amazon’s VM placem ent algorithm.
1. N parallel instantiations launched from a single account tend to result in placement
on N different machines.
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2. If a VM which runs on machine A is terminated and another VM is launched im 
mediately thereafter, then that new VM tends to be placed on machine A. This may
explain why the brute-forcing strategy did not fare as well.
3. Two VMs launched around the same time, from two different accounts, tend to be
assigned to the same machine.
4. There is a small inherent bias in assigning new VM instances to machines with light
loads.

They later outline possible ways to extract information from target victims once co
residence with the target is achieved. However, for the sake of space, we will not cover this
here. One thing should be noted. Though the case study is specific to Amazon, Ristenpart et
al. believe that modified variations of their technique can be extended to services supplied
by other cloud providers.

3.3.3 Discussion
From the above conclusions it seems the placement algorithm may inadvertently
assist miscreants in their mission to target and exploit other users. The first conclusion
helps maximize the search space for a particular victim. A machine co-residence check
only requires one probe instance. So ideally one VM, at most, should be assigned to
each machine. Further, the first and third conclusions together ensures heterogeneous VM
ownership per machine.
Two main problems form the central issue. The first - Am azon’s VM placement
algorithm is predictable and manipulable. The second - VM instances are directly con
nected to the Internet via port 80, and a DNS service, which translates public IPs to private
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IPs, is a major line o f defense for preventing malicious users from targeting, locating, and
exploiting honest users. Ristenpart et al. found a way to decode the map and presented the
details of their findings. To address these issues, we propose a solution in part inspired by
mussel self-organization. We describe the details o f this behavior in the next section.

3.4 Mussel Behavior
It is forseeable that a combinatorial rise in the possible combinations of user pref
erences could result in large computational overhead with deterministic or complete enu
meration algorithms. Thus, the use of heuristic algorithms may prove to be beneficial. We
extend the self-organization behavior of mussels to develop an algorithm to address such a
problem.

3.4.1 Background
Interactions between organisms, themselves, and the environment in which they live
leads to feedback which affects both the organisms and the environment. For mussels, the
magnitude of this feedback varies with distance - a phenomenon known as scale-dependent
feedback (SDF) [58]. There are two types of SDF: positive and negative. M ussels ex
perience positive SDF over short-range distances with respect to peers.

This leads to

cooperation between individuals in the vicinity. If there is short-range density, or a certain
number of peers per unit area in its immediate surroundings, an individual mussel tends
settle, or maintain its current position. It then secretes byssal threads to attach itself to the
shells of peers, rocks, or other various substrates. On the other hand, mussels experience
negative SDF ver long-range distances with respect to peers. This leads to competition
which restricts survival over long distances. If there is long-term density in its not so
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immediate surroundings, an individual mussel tends to move to a new location.

The

interplay between positive and negative SDF ultimately results in patches of optimal sized
clusters - large enough to decrease the risk of predation and water stress yet small enough
for the groups to withstand the risk o f food depletion.

3.4.2 The Model
Our research takes interest in this natural phenomenon and, in part, builds on the
work done by de Jager et al. In [59], they use empirical observations, theoretical and
computer modeling to determine that the Levy walk (LW) best characterizes mussel move
ment strategy. W hen compared to the Brownian walk or ballistic motion strategies, the LW
provides the best tit to experimental step length data, minimizes the time needed for pattern
formation, and is evolutionary stable to mussels differing in movement strategy.
To investigate the role of density dependence in pattern formation, de Jager et
al. observe mussel movements under laboratory conditions and meticulously extract step
length data. Mussels are evenly spread on a PVC sheet, and a webcam is positioned to
record their activity. Over time, the individual mussels move around to search for nearby
conspecifics. They use byssal threading to attach themselves to the bed when they find
a position which best balances neighbors with food availability.

This local clustering

behavior ultimately leads to a global spatial pattering in the mussel bed.
A histogram of the step length data reveals a heavy-tailed probability distribution.
This infers that when the step length data is plotted on a log-log scale, the general powerlaw function, shown in Equation 3.1, results in a straight line with slope -p,
p(l) = c i~ »

.

(3.1)

38
The parameter p determines the movement strategy. W hen lim ^

» 1, the strategy is

ballistic (straight-line) motion; and the likelihood of taking a large step is equal to that o f
taking a small step [60]. When /i > 3, the movement approximates a Brownian walk; and
when 1 < /i < 3, the strategy is taken to be a LW, where small steps are occasionally
alternated with larger ones [59,60]. The LW most commonly found in nature is p

2 [59],

For the LW, the normalization constant, C, is expressed by Equation 3.2 [61],

c = (n- i)C7,

(3.2)

where Imhl, (0 < lmin < 1), is a constraint which represents the minimum step length. An

lmin value of 0.42 provides the best results when fitting the actual data to the Levy walk.
For the truncated LW, the normalization constant C, is expressed by Equation 3.3,

where the steps, I, are only defined on the open interval lrnin < I < /,7)CJX. An lmin value o f
0.42 and an lmax value of 58.84 provided the best results when fitting the actual data to the
truncated LW. De Jager et al. use the Goodness-of-fit ( G ) value, shown in Equation 3.4,
to determine how well the frequency distributions of the movement strategies fit the actual
data. A value closer to zero indicates a better fit,
(3.4)
Here, O is the inverse cumulative distribution of the actual data; and E is the inverse
cumulative distribution of the fitted movement strategies. Table 3.1 shows how well the
strategy models fit the actual data. Notice, the Levy and truncated Levy strategies both
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yield comparable results, while the Brownian walk does not fare as well. In the end, the G
value suggests the truncated Levy strategy provides the best fit.

Table 3.1: Fitting movement strategies to actual experimental data

G
AIC weights
Adjusted R 2
Levy exponent

Movement Strategy
Truncated Levy Walk Levy Walk Brownian Motion
47.22
22.45
-190.09
0.428
0.443
0.129
0.997
0.997
0.837
2.01
2.06
-

To investigate how the LW movement strategy effects the rate of pattern formation,
de Jager et al. develop an individual-based model, where the density of conspecifics deter
mines whether or not individual mussels decide to move. Towards this end, multivariate
regression analysis of the experimental data reveals that mussels are more likely to stay if
there is short-range density - mussel density within a 3.3 cm radius, and are more likely to
move if there is long-range density - mussel density within a 22.5 cm radius. The linear
expression, shown in Equation 3.5, relates the chance o f movement

(Pm )

to long ( D L )

and short-range ( D s ) densities. By performing linear regression on experimental data, it is
determined that a = 0.63, b = 1.26, and c — 1.05. As indicated in Table 3.2, an individual
decides to move when its chance of movement is greater than a random value drawn from
a uniform distribution. Otherwise, it maintains its current position. If an individual mussel
decides to move, it takes a LW. That is to say, its direction, 0, is drawn from a uniform
distribution (depicted in Equation 3.6); and its step length, /, is drawn from a power law
distribution (shown in Equation 3.7).
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P m = a — bDs + cDL

.

(3.5)

e = 2ttw.

.

(3.6)

I=

w ~ £/((). 1)

Xnun ! , u' ~ (7(0,1)
(1

.

(3.7)

—

Table 3.2: Mussel behavior in response to scale-dependent feedback
SDF Type

Action

Condition

Positive
Negative

Settle
Move

P m < rand( 0,1)
P m > rand{ 0,1)

Over time, local density dependent interactions between individual mussels and
their peers lead to the emergence of a distinct global spatial patterning in the mussel bed.
Figure 3.1 shows the state of the mussel bed before the computer model starts and just after
it ends.

(a) B efore

(b) A fter

Figure 3.1: Original mussel bed clustering computer model
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3.4.3 The Algorithm
We use the model which describes mussel behavior to develop a bio-inspired heuris
tic clustering algorithm for multi-agent systems. We assume that agents make independent
decisions based on local asynchronous interactions and have limited memory. Thus, they
cannot remember past decisions or movements. Initially, agents with various basic abilities
are randomly distributed throughout the interaction environment. As a result, agents must
actively search for similiar agents and form specialized groups in order to be collectively
effective. Agents with similar abilities are said to be homogeneous, and agents with dissim
ilar abilities are said to be heterogeneous. The highlights o f the algorithm are:
1. first bio-inspired algorithm based on mussel behavior
2. decentralized - no central control
3. scalable to large agent set
Figure 3.2 shows the high level logic flow diagram. Each mussel agent initially
observes its surroundings and calculates the short and long range density which are, in turn,
used to determine its chance of movement. If it does not decide to move, it simply maintains
its current position for some time before re-observing its surroundings. On the other hand,
if it decides to move it selects a new position. If the new position is currently occupied,
it takes a truncated LW; otherwise, it takes a LW. The details are further explained in
Algorithm 5. As shown in lines 1-2, the onset is marked by setting the necessary parameters,
i.e, the number of mussel agents, agent attributes, sensing radii, etc., and initializing the
agent set to random (A", Y) positions. The main parameters of the mussel alogorithm
are summarized in Table 3.3. Notice that each agent uses three different sensing radii to
determine the density of: homogeneous agents within a short range, heterogenous agents
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within a medium range, and any agent within a long range. The following steps are repeated
until the number of maximum steps is reached. Each mussel agent uses the Euclidean
distance to determine the distance of all other agents - line 7; determines the positive SDF
by counting only the number of homogeneous peers in its short range sensing radius - lines
8-9; determines the negative SDF by counting both the number of hetergeneous peers in its
medium range sensing radius and the number of any peer in its long range sensing radius
- lines 10-11; uses the positve and negative SDF to determine the short and long range
density - lines 12-13; calculates the chance o f movement - line 14; selects new position if it
decides to move - lines 15-19; takes a truncated LW if the new position is occupied - lines
20-21; and takes a LW if the new position is not occupied - lines 23-25.

M ussel A g en t |

C a lc u late s h o r t (Ds)
a n d long ra n g e (DL)
d e n sity
S tay
No
D e te rm in e ch a n c e o f
m o v e m e n t (PM)

M ove?
Yes

S elect n e w p o sitio n

N ew p o sitio n

^occupied?^
Yes

Take tr u n c a te d Levy
w alk

Take Levy w alk

Figure 3.2: Logic flow diagram

No
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Algorithm 5: Mussel agent clustering algorithm
set the necessary parameters ;
2 initialize mussel (x. y) positions;
3 repeat
foreach mussel i in 0 to \T\ do
4
SD F pos < 0 . SD F n<r/ <-():
5
foreach mussel j in 0 to \T\ do
6
7
dt,j = \J{xt - Xj)2 + (y, - y3)2
if dij < Di A g(i) = g(j) then
8
1

SDFpos + + ;

9

if D x < ditj < D2 V dij < D3 A g{i) ± g(j) then

10

S D F neg + + ;

11

Ds = (SDFpos ~ 1)/(*£>?) ;
A = (SDFneg - l ) / ( 7tD\) ;
Pm A- according to Equation 3.5 ;
if Pm > rand then
di A - according to Equation 3.6 ;
Li a- according to Equation 3.7 ;

12
13
14

15
16
17

p x t = x, + c,os(0i ) * L i ;
py, = Vi + sin {6 i) * Li ;
if pxi ^ occupied A pig F occupied then
| xxriew A- p xi , y jn e w A - py, ;
else
Lm in A- calculate truncated step length ;
xxnew = x, + cos(di) * A * L m in ;
yjnew = yi 4- sin(di) * L,- * L m in ;

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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until maxSteps;

Table 3.3: The main parameters o f the mussel algorithm

T
9
Dx
d2
D3
3 m in

set of agents
set of agent attributes
sensing radius used for short range density of homogeneous agents
sensing radius used for long range density of any agent
sensing radius used for medium range density o f heterogeneous agents
minimum walking distance
exponent for Levy movement strategy

44
3.4.4 Example Mussel Subscription
Now, suppose that we have 1800 users. Each of which is able can choose from two
preferences: VM size and workflow duration. Further consider that each preference has
two options. A V M ’s size can either be large or small, and the duration of workflows can
either be based on hours or days. As shown in Table 3.4, users can belong to one o f four
categories. If a user intends to use a small VM for a few hours, then he/she will be placed in
workload category I. The color red is used to identify those users in this category. Similarly,
those users who prefer a large VM for a few hours will be placed in workload category II
- denoted by the color blue; those who desire a small VM for a few days will be placed in
workload category III - denoted by the color green; and those who wish to use a large VM
for a few days will be placed in workload category IV - denoted by the color yellow.

Table 3.4: Assigning categories to user preferences

small

VM Size
large

—

j4:J

tsfi

3
£

I (red)

11(blue)

III (green)

IV (yellow)

c<D

For this example, we assume that users are indifferent to the preferences. That is
to say, the odds of being placed in any o f the four categories are the same. Figure 3.3(a)
shows the initial state of the logical field once each user is placed in a workload category
based on preferences and assigned random (A", Y) coordinates. The system reaches steady
state after some time, and gives rise to an emergent clustering pattern between users with
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like preferences - as shown in Figure 3.3(b). Notice the cells. Here, cells are analogous to
accounts. Users are subscribed to the cell in which their indicator settles. After some time
account membership dissolves - Figure 3.3(c); and users are subscribed to new accounts Figure 3.3(d).

(b) A fter

(a) B efo re

R ^FE FFf

m
m

rc fc ;: b f i ;

.
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z& rm m
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$

■ u h\m :- iJ r-A 'iiy c
£m
iMiki/ 'wm
M um m u

ta ±
(c) D iss o lv e

Md
(d) R egroup

Figure 3.3: Users cluster according to mussel behavior.

3.5 Proposed Framework
We now describe the technical analysis of the mussel-inspired self-organization
approach towards reducing the risks of adversary exploitation as described by Ristenpart
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et al [1]. They conclude by stating cloud providers should obfuscate the internal structure
of their services and placement policies in order to complicate the adversary’s attempts.
However, obfuscation of topology and placement policy leads to additional computational
overhead when doing VM placement, CPU load balancing, traffic shaping and workload
migrations. They additionally state that such obfuscation techniques should be demanded
only by customers with strong privacy requirements, but this additional differentiation
in user classification and infrastructure configuration leads to more complex registration,
preference analysis, and configuration options. We suggest defining a single user manage
ment and placement solution that comes with low-computation placement and topology
obfuscation inherently, without causing a change in the familiar interface exposed to cloud
users. Figure 3.4 provides an overview of the integrated solution’s technical architecture.

DMZ

Cloud In frastru ctu re
Host2

users

Gateway

— cius
Hestl

«• _H vm?~]

clusterl
ap#: account proxy
vm#: virtual machine
gp#:gatew ay interface with public IP
gr#: gatew ay inter face to private IP
cluster#: logical VM cluster from mussel algorithm
host#: physical host for VM creation

Figure 3.4:
allocation

Muss«l-bas*d
Allocator/Controller

Technical architecture of the account proxies and mussel-based account

Al
Here, each logical cluster (cluster#) is managed and accessed by the same account
proxy (ap#). An account proxy has one public IP address, which is hence shared by all
account owners in a cluster when accessing their instances, and the account proxy maintains
the mapping to private IP addresses. There is hence no 1-to -1 mapping of public to private
IP addresses or dependence on a sequential allocation o f private IP addresses. A l-to-7;
mapping of public to private IP addresses is implemented by most modern ApplicationLevel Gateways that include Network Address Translation (NAT) and traversal. The se
quence of interactions of a typical user is as follows:
1. Subscription of user with the cloud infrastructure via an accessible gateway interface,
gpO, with a static public IP address. The user provides a username, password and
collection of preferences (duration, CPU, memory, availability zone), encrypted with
the public key of the cloud infrastructure provider.
2. The user information is checked against subscription policies and forwarded to the
Mussel-based Allocator/Controller, which is responsible for creating/dissolving groups
and account proxies, as well as assigning users and VM instances to account proxies,
groups, and physical hosts respectively. VMs with similar workload and access
preferences are assigned to the same physical host when possible.
3. The Allocator/Controller creates a new account proxy (ap#) if necessary and assigns
or adds the user to an existing account.
4. Asynchronously, the Allocator/Controller selects a host to create the requested VM
instance and starts the VM instance assigning it a random IP address from a pool of
unassigned private addresses.
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5. The public IP of the newly created VM is mapped to the private IP and returned to the
user as a uniform resource identifier (URI) of form /{ip of gp#}/{userid}/{vm Jd}.
6. The user uses URI to send requests to VM including start, stop, modify or ssh.
7. The account proxy translates URI into a private IP and forwards the requests to VM.
8. Responses from the VM are returned to the user as if the target was the public IP
address of the account proxy.

We assume that each user and the cloud provider are able to generate and main
tain non-compromised public-private key pairs (e.g. RSA [62]) and symmetric keys (e.g.
AES [63]) such that the above interactions can be secured using protocols like transport
layer security (TLS) [64]. This is among the current best practices from leading cloud
providers such as Amazon [65], and is an effective approach for minimising cloud com
munications risks such as man-in-the-middle, session high-jacking and replay attacks - as
also denoted in [66-68] These types of attacks are hence not the focus of the solution as
these are part of best practices in cloud security. On the other hand, we are interested in
mitigating the impact co-resident placement and data extraction have on an attacker’s ability
to carry out successful exploits against a given target set; or, said another way, we would
like to determine the maximum amount o f co-residence knowledge an attacker can infer
when there is workload similarity amongst peers. Towards this end, we specify 3 breach
impact levels: low, medium, and high. A low level breach impact means that an attacker
cannot differentiate the workload owner and the workload type from that o f other peers. A
medium level breach impact means that the enumeration of workload owner and workload
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type is possible; and a high level breach impact means that an attacker can differentiate
workload owner and type.
We now describe the set of capabilities and attack path an attacker needs to execute
for targeted co-residence. As shown in Figure 3.5, we do not provide a solution to stopping
step 1 - malicious VMs or scripts from being installed in the cloud infrastructure, as this de
pends on the types of pre-installation scanning mechanisms the provider implements. Our
solution aims to remove the usefulness of public-to-private IP address mappings observable
by the attacker, which impacts on steps 2, 3, and 4 in the attack path shown in Figure 3.5.
Mapping one public IP address to n randomly assigned private IP addresses reduces the
specificity of knowledge gained by an attacker with the capability to do internal domain
name resolution. The records of mappings will have collisions, which serve to impede
targeted co-residence by introducing additional effort and cost for the attacker, in that more
brute-force attempts and malicious instances need to be deployed.

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Install VM with DNS lookup scripts
P ro b e w eb -serv e rs externally to c h e c k
resp o n siv e public IPs
U se internal DNS lookup to m ap public
IPs to private IPs
R ecord u n iq u e public to private m appings
IF m ore G O TO 2. ELSE e n d

/S *

K

hard/indistinguishable

/S *

^

/ st

^

easy/distinguishable

? partial/enum erable

Figure 3.5: Attack capabilities and path to map public to private IPs
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Figure 3.6 shows that the critical step 5 in the attack path is disrupted by our
approach, as there is no pattern used for private IP address assignment. The assignment
of IP addresses by a dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) server will follow a
predictable sequence by default, but this can be configured to randomly select from the pool
o f available IP addresses. There is no need for an administrator to allocate IP addresses per
availability zone as groups are assigned responsibility for specific IP addresses.

1

X

>

)

)

)

)

Install VM for IP assignm entrecording
Specify VM oftype x
Install VM oftype x in cloud
Record private IP of newly-installed VM
Infer IP a s s ig n m e n t p attern for ty p e x
IF try further GOTO 7, ELSE end
Vary type specification ofx. GOTO 2
)

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
< H

hard/indistinguishable

/

easy/distinguishable

' partial/enumerable

Figure 3.6: Attack path to determine mapping of VM types to IP ranges and availability
zones

Notice Figures 3.7 and 3,8. In each case, step 5 is not explicitly addressed by our
solution. It is still possible for the attacker to execute tracert on randomly selected private IP
addresses and test for co-residence based on equivalent DomO addresses or relatively short
round trip times. However, in both cases the attacker is forced to follow a random selection
as opposed to following a sequence. Therefore a successful co-residence detection does
not reveal knowledge about other IP addresses that are numerically close.
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1)
2)
3)
4)

InstallV M with t r a c e d sc rip t
S e le c t p riv ate IP o f ta rg e t
D o tra c e rt on p riv ate IP o f ta rg e t
C h e c k first h o p in tra c e rt a g a in s t la s t h o p
o f b e fo re ta rg e t

5) IF first hop equals last hop infer share
DomO => co-residence:
6)

IF m o re ta r g e ts G O T O 2 e ls e e n d

Figure 3.7: Determination of co-residence using DomO equivalence check

1)
2)
3)
4)

InstallV M
S e le c t p riv ate IP within n u m eric ra n g e
Do p in g o n p riv ate IP o f ta r g e t
C h e c k ro u n d trip tim e (rtt)

5) IF response and "short" rtt: Infer coresidence:
6)

l £ m o r e J a r g e ts G O T Q 2 e ls e e n d

Figure 3.8: Determination of co-residence using relative round trip time estimate

3.6 Risk Assessment
Up until this point, we have discussed how our solution provides measures to
prevent users from being targeted and exploited. However, it is quite possible for users to be
random victims of non-directed exploits. We now perform a risk assessment to determine
the likelihood of this event. With that said, suppose a malicious user decides to randomly
target users belonging to any account proxy. Let user A denote a particular user amongst
those which could be victimized; and let group B describe all users aside from user A.
Below, we list three events.
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Event A\. User A is not victimized
Event A 2: Group B users are not victimized
Event B: A successful exploit occurs
Further,
P(A i) = a

P (Aft = 1 - a

P ( B \ A x) = ft

P (B | A 2) = 1 - ft

Here, P(Ai) is the likelihood that user A is not victimized; P (A2) is the likelihood group B
users are not victimized; P(B | A]) is the likelihood a successful exploit occurs, given that
user A is not victimized; and P(i? | A 2) is the likelihood a successful exploit occurs, given
that group B users are not victimized. We assume that events A\ and A 2 are mutually
exclusive.

We now use B ayes ’ Theorem to determine the likelihood user A is N O T

victimized, given that a successful exploit occurred.

P ( A i )P(B I Ai ) + P ( A2)P{B I a 2)
aft
ft ft + (1 — o ) ( l — ft)

(3.8)

Further, suppose that all users each have a VM deployed, each account proxy has

Mj members, and there are N total account proxies. Further consider that each proxy
has the same chance of being targeted, and that members assigned to each account have
the same chance of being victimized. Then, the chance of user A being victimized is the
likelihood that his particular account proxy is targeted, 1/N, times the likelihood that user
A will be randomly targeted, 1/Mj. This yields l / N M j . Thus, the chance that user A will
not be victimized is expressed in Equation 3.9. Notice, here, we use // to denote the product
of N and Mj. Moreover, as denoted in Equation 3.10, we say that the likelihood of user A
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being victimized is the same as the chance that users from group B are not victimized.

1 1
0

=

i - i

1

(3.9)
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p

(3.10)
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Substituting Equations 3.9 and 3.10 into Equation 3.8, we receive
ft

i — i

P(A,

|

B)

ii

' i - i

,8
ii _

i

+
p

(i-ft)
.

f t p - ft
flu-23+1
11
I'
'p- 1
f t~l + n - 2

(3.11)

'

In a similar sense, we use B ayes ’ Theorem to determine the likelihood that users from
group B are N O T victimized, given that a successful exploit occurred.

P(A2 \B)

=

P ( A 2) P( B I a 2)
P ( A \ ) P ( B | Ai) + P ( A 2)P(B
<l-a)(l-/3)

aft

+ (1 — « ) ( 1 —

|

A 2)
(3.12)

3)

Substituting Equations 3.9 and 3.10 into Equation 3.12, we find
i

P(A2 \B)
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Given an exploit, events A\ and A 2 are equally likely when
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Setting e = ft 3 and solving for n we receive

(// - l)(c - 23 + 1) =
//f - 2f — 1 =
f(/ r — 2)

=

(l-/3)(,3-1+ /7 - 2 )
.r 1

- 3

1 1- 2

/T

e

—

•

(3.15)

The parameters for Equations 3.11 3.13, and 3.15 are N, Mj, and /). To understand
how the number of members (Mj) affect P(Aj \B) and P ( A 2\B), we arbitrarily choose

N = 36, vary the values of parameters Mj and fi, and plot the results. The interpretation
of the graphs is quite intuitive. As shown in Figure 3.9, it is highly likely a user A will be
NOT victimized, given a successful exploit has occurred.
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Figure 3.9: P(A\\B), The likelihood user A is not victimized.
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The chances increase both as the number of account proxy members and the number
of account proxies increase. That is to say, if you had virtual resources in the cloud and
a random non-directed exploit occurred, chances are someone else was affected. This
likelihood increases as the number of members subscribed to your account proxy increases
- especially for low ft values. In Figure 3.9, for instance, notice that having > 15 members
ensures that you have a 90% chance of being unaffected when ft < 0.1. However, when

ft > 0.5, these odds are > 90% regardless of proxy membership. The reverse is true for
a member from group B. If an exploit occurred, one of the many users in group B is most
likely the victim. As shown in Figure 3.10, the chances o f a user from group B not being
the victim decrease as ft increases.
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Figure 3.10: P ( A 2\B), The likelihood that users from group B are not victimized.

Further, having more members subscribed to one’s respective proxy does little to
alter these odds when ft > 0.5. For events A\ and A 2 to be equally likely, /j, the product o f
the number of members, Mj, and the number o f proxies, N, has to be an integer - since Mj
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and N are both integers. This only occurs for a select values of Mj and 3 when ,3 < 0.4
- as shown in Figure 3.11. When 3 > 0.4, the events are equally likely when // = 2. The
values of M3 are negligible in this case.
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Figure 3.11: P (A i\B ) = P (A 2\B), When events A\ and A 2 are equally likely

To understand how the number of account proxies (N) affect P( Ai \ B) and P {A 2\B),
we arbitrarily choose N values above and below 36, and use the same set of values for
parameters Mj and [3. If N is much lower than 36, we expect individuals to be more at risk
of being randomly victimized for lower values of Mj (when compared to the case where

N = 36). The opposite is true for N values much higher than 36. In this case, we expect
individuals to be less at risk of being randomly victimized for lower values of Mj (when
compared to the case where N = 36). Figures 3.12 and 3.13 tend to support each of these
claims. We do not present P{A2\B) for these graphs - as each decays exponentially (similar
to the way that Figure 3.10 corresponds to Figure 3.9).
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered an exploit which targets cloud users - as outlined by
Ristenpart et al [1], We proposed a solution which relies on mussel-inspired user account
and workload clustering and account proxies to obfuscate the public to private IP map. We
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then presented arguments to show how our strategy increases the effort required for an
adversary to carry out a directed attack against a target set. Further, we gave results from
a risk assessment that suggest a reduced per-individual chance of being victimized given a
non-directed attack.

3.8 From Cloud Security to Community Detection
The next objective involved extending the mussel algorithm to the community de
tection domain. However, after conducting various experiments, we determined that the
mussel algorithm was not flexible enough to handle network datasets of varying size. It
worked well for large populations, where there was a lot o f interacting individuals. How
ever, it did not fare as well for small populations. Some social networks can have less than
50 nodes. In such cases, the system never reaches steady state - as there are not enough
peers to meet each individual’s short and long-term density thresholds. For this reason,
we derived another algorithm to detect communities. We present our greedy heuristic for
community detection in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4
SCALE-FREE NETWORK CONNECTIVITIES AND
COMMUNITY DETECTION
Recent research suggests that node connectivities in social networks follow a scalefree power-law distribution. On Twitter, for instance, large communities tend to form
around popular celebrities. Some followers possess an avid interest, while others either
preferentially attach or follow those who the majority of their peers follow. We propose a
greedy community detection heuristic which exploits these characteristics. Like celebrities,
we hypothesize that highly connected nodes, or hubs, form the basic building blocks of
communities. We assume that each community has one global hub, and that nodes with
lower degrees preferentially attach to hubs in their vicinity. We then frame community
detection as a node to hub assignment problem. To show its effectiveness, we test our algo
rithm on four commonly used real network data sets. We obtain the following modularity
(Q) values for three data sets: karate network - Q = 0.3715, dolphin network - Q = 0.3735,
and political books - Q = 0.4492. In each case, our algorithm consistently classifies nodes
into communities which coincide with their respective known structures. We additionally
receive Q = 0.4592 for the college football data set. Unlike other implementations, ours is
computationally inexpensive, deterministic, and does not require apriori information.
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4.1 Introduction
Many complex networks have underlying community structures which could prove
useful when attempting to understand the dynamics o f within-group interactions.

The

potential benefits have broad impacts in a variety o f fields, i.e., computer science, biology,
marketing, sociology, etc.

This has recently led to a strong demand for the develop

ment o f methods which are effective at detecting and/or discovering community structures.
Towards this end, several community detection algorithms have been proposed [69-73].
Most of these, however, share similar disadvantages.

Some algorithms require apriori

information, such as threshold values or the desired number of communities, while others
are impractical and computationally expensive [74]. A third category of algorithms suffer
from a combination of the two.
Our objective is to develop a more intuitive and m ore practical method for commu
nity detection. Recent research [75-77] has suggested that social networks tend to follow a
heavy-tailed distribution - where a few nodes, called hubs, possess high connectivity, while
the overwhelming majority of other nodes possess low connectivity. We hypothesize that
hubs form the basic building blocks of communities, and thus are the key to community
detection. A detection technique which exploits hubs and the scale-free properties of social
networks remains largely unexplored throughout recent literature. This hence provides the
necessary motivation for our work. We outline our contributions below.
1.

Our algorithm is practical, deterministic, easy to implement, and scalable. It
discovers community structures without the need o f apriori information, i.e., thresh
old values, community size restrictions, or the desired number of communities.
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2.

In [78], the authors define modularity (Q) - a metric for measuring the strength
of community structure that since has become well-known and commonly used. They
state that in practice values “typically fall in the range from about 0.3 to 0.7.” We
obtain the following modularity values for three datasets: Zachary’s Karate Net
work [79] - Q = 0.3715, bottlenose dolphin network [80] - Q = 0.3735, and books
about U.S. politics [81] - Q = 0.4492. In each case, our algorithm consistently clas
sifies nodes into communities which coincide with their respective known structures.
We also apply our method on the American college football data set, and receive Q =

0.4592.

The rest of this chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 4.2 offers the nec
essary background information (i.e., commonly used definitions for network, community,
and modularity). Section 4.3 discusses previous work. Section 4.4 defines the problem,
gives the approach, and presents our algorithm. Section 4.5 details the real-world network
data we consider. Section 4.6 provides our results and compares them to those reported by
other researchers. Section 4.7 covers a small discussion on various issues we encountered
while validating our algorithm; and Section 4.8 yields concluding remarks.

4.2 Background
4.2.1 What is a Community?
For community detection, a network is typically represented by an undirected and
unweighted graph. This graph, G = (V, E), is an ordered pair comprised of a set of vertices
(sometimes referred as nodes), V, interconnected by a set o f edges. The goal of community
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detection is to find a disjoint partition G = C\ U C 2 . . . U Ck, where each Ck represents a
community.
There are various definitions for what constitutes a community. However, a com
monly used definition states that a community is a subset or group of nodes where the
number of internal connections (between nodes within the group) are exceedingly dense
and the number of external connections (to nodes outside the group) are exceedingly sparse.
In [82], Radicchi et al. use the degrees o f nodes inside and outside a group to define
community - in terms of both a weak and strong sense. Assuming that d\n represents the
degrees of node i inside its group Ck, and d°ut represents its degrees o f node i outside group

Ck, then group Ck is said to form a strong community if the internal degree is greater the
external degree for all nodes ? in group Ck [83] - as shown in Equation 4.1.

d? > d ^ l,yi e c k

(4.1)

On the other hand, group Ck is said to form a community in a weak sense if the sum of the
internal degrees of all nodes in group Ck is greater than the sum o f the external degrees of
all nodes in group Ck [83] - as denoted in Equation 4.2.
(4.2)

4.2.2 Measuring the Strength o f Community Structure
In [78], Newman and Girvan propose a metric for measuring the strength o f com
munity structure, which they call modularity (Q). The main idea behind this metric is that
the fraction of within-community edges should be greater than the expected number of
edges found in a random null model. This model preserves the order of the graph and
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individual node degrees, but forms random connections between nodes without regard for
community structures.

If the number of within-community edges is no better than its

random counterpart, then Q = 0. On the other hand, a modularity value closer to one
denotes strong community structure. They define modularity to be
(4.3)
where e„ is the fraction of edges that fall within the same community and

is the expected

fraction of randomly distributed edges in that community. In [84J, Clauset et al. further
expand on the definition of modularity and define Q to be
(4.4)
where m is the number of edges, A vw is the adjacency matrix, kv and kw are the degrees
of nodes v and w, respectively, and cv and cw are the communities to which nodes u
and w belong, respectively. d(c„, cw) denotes whether node v and w belong in the same
communities. If one then, they both belong to the same community. Otherwise, they each
belong to different communities.

4.3 Previous Work
To date, several solutions have been proposed to address the community detection
problem, i.e., Girvan-Newman algorithm [78,85], label propagation algorithm [71,83,86],
modularity maximization [72, 87J, genetic algorithms [70, 88, 89], etc.

Most of these,

however, share similar disadvantages. Some algorithms require apriori information, such
as threshold values or the desired number of communities, while others are impractical and
computationally expensive [74]. A third category o f algorithms suffer from a combination
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of the two. We give two examples of previous research. The first is a community detection
method based on divisive hierarchical clustering; and the second is a detection method
based on nearest neighbors interactions.
In [78], Newman and Girvan hypothesize that edges which lie between communities
have the highest “betweenness” value. They derive three methods for calculating between
ness scores (shortest path, resistor networks, random walk), separately incorporate each of
these into a divisive method which removes the links with the highest value, and apply their
algorithms to real-world network data. To determine how well their algorithms performed,
they develop a metric (modularity) to denote the quality o f network partitions. The main
drawbacks of the shortest path algorithm, the best of the three, is that it is computationally
intensive and does not scale well. The time complexity for each iteration is 0(rn2n), where

n is the number of nodes and rn is the number of edges.
The technique which most resembles ours is the label propagation algorithm (LPA).
In [83], Raghaven et al. use this method to assign each node unique labels. Then, in an
iterative fashion, nodes adopt the label which coincides with the majority o f their neighbors.
In the event there is a tie, nodes randomly choose among eligible candidates. The nodes
with the same label are assigned to the same community when the maximum number of
steps is reached. The authors state that their algorithm, “uses the network structure alone
as its guide and requires neither optimization of a pre-defined objective function nor prior
information about the communities.” Further, it runs near linear time and is thereby less
computationally expensive. The downside with this method is that it invokes a stochastic
process for breaking ties.

This leads to non- deterministic results, i.e., different runs

produce different community structures. To remedy this, the authors combine multiple
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results to form an aggregate solution. Our solution, on the other hand, comes with similar
benefits, but yields consistent results.

4.4 Greedy Heuristic for Community Detection
4.4.1 Problem Definition
We describe community detection as a node assignment problem. Node to Hub

Assignment Problem (N-HAP): Given an adjacency matrix, assign nodes to hubs such
that each node belongs the closest hub with the maximum number o f connections, subject
to the constraint that the majority o f each node ’s peers are members o f the same hub.
4.4.2 The Approach
To solve this problem, we first hypothesize that hubs, or highly connected nodes,
form the basic building blocks of communities; and thus are key to community discovery.
The notion that node degrees follow a scale-free power-law distribution for social networks
was first proposed by Barabasi and Reka. In [77], they found that this distribution was the
consequence of two primary mechanisms: continual network expansion by the addition of
new nodes and preferential attachment of new nodes to highly connected nodes. In other
words, for social networks, a “rich gets richer” effect leads to a handful o f nodes having
an unusually high number of connections and the majority of nodes having an unusually
low number of connections. Given this, we assume that each community has a single hub,
and that nodes with lower degrees preferentially attach to hubs in their vicinity. Hence, our
approach for solving N-HAP is to have each hub start a community, and have nodes o f lower
degrees use their nearest neighbors to find and join their respective local communities.
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4.4.3 The Algorithm
Our algorithm can he divided in four phases. The first phase is initialization. In
this phase, each node compares its degree with those of its nearest neighbors. If a node
has the highest local degree, it declares itself as a hub. Otherwise, it joins its local hub.
The second phase is oblivious bandwagoning. In the event a hub is connected to a node
that is associated with a hub of a higher degree, it along with its followers join the com
munity associated with that node. This is done to prevent local convergence - for not all
local hubs end up being global hubs. The third phase is majority rules. Each node then
verifies whether it belongs to the same community as the majority o f its peers and changes
membership in the event that this is not the case. The final phase is to repeat phase two -

oblivious bandwagoning. This is done to propagate the changes (if any) invoked by phase
three throughout the network. In phase one and two, each node carries out the objective
- as denoted in Table 4.1; and in phase three and four, each node enforces the constraint also denoted in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: N-HAP from global and local perspective
input:
objective:
constraint:
output:

Global
Local
Local
Global

adjacency matrix
join closest hub with max connections
majority of peers are members of the same hub
assignment of nodes to a set of hubs

Our algorithm’s pseudocode is given in Algorithm 6. Phase one is implemented in
the first for loop - lines 1 - 7. Based on the degree of self and the degree of peers, a node
will either: declare itself as a hub, join the hub of a peer with equivalent degree, or join the
hub of the peer with the maximum degree. Phase two is implemented in lines 8 - 14. There
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are three cases where a node will change hubs. Sometimes a node declares itself as a hub,
but has little to no members. In this case, it joins the hub that coincides with the majority
of its peers - line 10. There also may be a case where a node has peers whose memberships
are equally divided between two or more hubs. Here, a node does a continual refresh each
iteration to ensure it joins the hub that has the highest degree - line 12.

Algorithm 6: Greedy heuristic for community detection
Input: Adjacency Matrix
Output: Assignment of Nodes to a Set o f Hubs
1 foreach node in i in 1 to \V | do
2
if degree of self > degree o f peers then
3
| declare self as hub;
4
else if no max degree among peers then
5
| join hub of 1st tied peer (or take 1st peer as hub);
6
else
7
join hub of peer with max degree;
8 while at least 1 node changes hubs do
9
if hub A most peers belong to another hub then
10
L join hub that coincides with majority o f peers;
n
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

if peer membership divided between > 2 hubs then
L join hub that has greatest degree;
if hub joins new hub then
L join hub that former hub joined;
foreach node in i in 1 to \V\ do
if majority of peers belong to another hub then
store ID of node,;
store ID of majority _hub,;
determine priority using max relative hub frequency;
use priority to sort nodes that need hub change;
use priority to sort new majority_hubs;
foreach node in i in 1 to |nodes Jo.change | do
node, joins new majorityJhub,;

24 Repeat steps 8 -1 7 ;
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In the event, a hub joins another hub, its followers update their membership to
reflect the new change - line 14. This phase continues until all nodes stop changing hubs.
Phase three is denoted by lines 15 - 23. In the for loop, nodes determine whether they
belong to the same hub as the majority of their peers. If this is not the case, they associate
themselves with a ratio which will be used for prioritization. This ratio is simply the number
of majority peers which belong to the same hub divided by the total number o f peers. Next,
according the priority, nodes change hubs to that which coincides with the majority o f their
peers. Here, prioritization is key - for the act o f randomly reassigning nodes to hubs could
lead to a misclassification ripple effect. We will cover this in detail in the discussion section.
The last phase, shown in line 24, propagates the changes (if any) o f hub reassignment due
to majority rules.
There is one thing we should note. The constraint specified in N-HAP coincides
with the definition of a community in the strong sense as outlined in Equation 4.1. However,
there is one case which will prevent full compliance with this constraint - line 10 - a case
where a node has the number of peers inside its group equal to the num ber o f peers outside
its group. Typically this involves nodes that are situated between communities. A node
which falls in this category will not be able to comply with the constraint - for majority
rules is not applicable. We refer to this as deadlock. There is no best way to resolve
this issue. In our algorithm, a node responds to deadlock by carrying out the objective
and disregarding the constraint. In other words, the hub with the highest degree is the tie
breaker. For example, if a node of degree six had three peers in one community and three in
another, it would simply join the community of the peers which are associated with the hub
of the highest degree. This is rather arbitrary, but tends to gam er good results. Nonetheless,
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given the special case of deadlock, we say that our algorithm creates strong communities
in a best effort fashion.
As shown in Algorithm 6, our method contains: three for loops, two while loops,
and two sorts. In the initialization phase, one of three basic statements execute per iteration.
Assuming that \V\ = n, this requires T = n time. In the oblivious bandwagoning phase,
again, one of three basic statements execute per iteration. Given that there are less hubs
than there are nodes, and that all nodes will not change hubs, this requires T = kn time where k < n. For phase three, a for loop is used to determine the priority of node changes.
Here, there are two basic store statements, and one statement which stores the maximum
value o f an array - T = 2w + X T 0^- Next, there are two sorts and another fo r loop.
Assuming a quicksort method, this requires T = 2 w * login + w. Since some nodes will
already belong to the same hub as the majority of their peers, the time phase three requires
is T = 3 w + XX” di + 2wlogw, where w < n. Phase four requires the same time as phase
2 - T = n. Hence, overall, our algorithm requires time
It*
(4.5)

4.4.4 Detecting Community Structure for Complete Graphs
To demonstrate how our algorithm handles complete graphs (a case where there are
no hubs), we present a AT, graph in Figure 4.1 Notice, there are five nodes, and every pair
of nodes are connected by a unique edge. The labels denote each node’s ID. This graph has
strong community structure - for the internal degree (4) is greater than the external degree
(0) for all nodes. Thus, all nodes should be assigned to one community.
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Figure 4.1: K5 complete graph
Following our algorithm, Algorithm 6 - line 2 does not hold for any node, thus no
node would declare itself as hub. In this case, each node would follow line 3, and would
take its first peer as hub. Table 4.2 presents the attributes for all nodes. Notice, node 2 is
the first neighbor of node 1; and for all other nodes, node 1 is the first neighbor. So in the
initialization phase, node 1 would declare node 2 as hub; and all other nodes would declare
node 1 as hub. Next, in the oblivious bandwagoning phase, node 1 would notice that most
of its peers belong to a different node, line 9, and would declare itself as hub - line 10. In
this case, only lines 1-17 are required for community detection. Here, the algorithm ’s total
running time is O (n).

Table 4.2: Node attributes for K5 complete graph
Node ID

Degree

Neighbors

Max Peer ID

Join Hub

1
2

4
4
4
4
4

2,3,4,5
1,3,4,5
1,2,4,5
1,2,3,5
1,2,3,4

-

2
1
1
1
1

3
4
5
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4.5 Real-W orld Network Data Sets
In this section, we present three real-world network data sets commonly used in
community detection literature: Zachary’s karate club [79], bottlenose dolphin network [80],
and books on U.S. politics [81]. For each data set, we give a brief overview, show the known
community structures (as discovered by our method), and display the histogram.

4.5.1 Zachary’s Karate Club
Zachary’s karate club data set describes a three year observation of social interac
tions between members of a karate club. Towards the beginning, a dispute emerged between
the club president and the karate instructor over the cost o f lessons. Over time, this dispute
caused a rift between the club members. Some aligned themselves with the president,
while others rallied support for the instructor. Thus, there are two known communities in
this network. The graph of this network’s known structures, as discovered by our method,
is shown in Figure 4.2. Notice, there are two nodes with high connectivity - node 1, which
represents the instructor, and node 34 which represents the president. The other nodes
have low connectivity and are connected directly or indirectly to either node 1 or node 34.
The degree distribution is shown in Figure 4.3. As expected, the majority of nodes with
low degrees appear with great frequency, while the nodes with high degrees appear great
infrequency. This tends to support the idea that social networks have scale-free properties.
Further, the fact that the club divided into two factions - each centered around the two most
connected people tends to give credence to our initial hypothesis that communities tend to
form around hubs - in this case nodes 1 and 34.
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Figure 4.2: Zachary’s karate network: known structure as discovered by our method

D e g r e e Distribution

N o d e D eg r e e

Figure 4.3: Zachary’s karate network degree distribution

This data set is extensively used in community detection literature. The network is
small - consists of 34 nodes and 78 edges. Thus, the results from a community detection
algorithm can easily be verified by hand. Methods which use this data set tend to misclassify one node - typically either node 3 or 10. The authors in [78J misclassify node 3.
They place it in the pink community instead of the green community. The authors in [90J
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misclassify node 10. Further, the authors in [74J consistently place 33 out of 34 nodes
in the correct community. A question which naturally comes to mind is: why are these
particular nodes hard to correctly classify? Notice nodes 3 and 10 in Figure 4.2. They are
both deadlocked - as both have an equal number o f neighbors in each community. Node 3
has five neighbors in each community; and node 10 has one neighbor in each community.
This poses a problem because it violates the quantitative definition for a community in the
strong sense. For other algorithms, such as the LPA, a random selection may be used to
select a community given these circumstances. In the discussion section, we explain how
our algorithm handles this problem for this data set.

4.5.2 Bottlenose Dolphin Network
The bottlenose dolphin network data set describes a seven year observation o f social
interactions among dolphins in Doubtful Sound, New Zealand. Here, the school divided
into two groups when the individuals connected at the boundaries of both groups suddenly
disappeared. This network contains 62 nodes and 159 edges. The graph of the known
community structures, as discovered by our method, is shown in Figure 4.4. Notice, the
degree distribution in Figure 4.5. There seems to be a few nodes with degrees higher than
expected. This may lead to local convergence/subgrouping - as we shall see. Though
there are two known communities, many detection algorithms divide this data set into four
communities [78,86-89].
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Figure 4.4: Bottlenose dolphin network: known structure as discovered by our method

D e g r e e Distribution
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Figure 4.5: Bottlenose dolphin network degree distribution
4.5.3 Books on U.S. Politics
This data set describes political books purchased on Amazon.com [91] during the
2004 U.S. presidential election. Relationships between books represent books frequently
purchased by the same buyers. As shown in Figure 4.6, the book communities divide along
political preference and affiliation - i.e., liberal or conservative. The degree distribution
is shown in Figure 4.7. Flere, the disparity between the frequency o f nodes with low
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degree to that of nodes with high degree is quite noticeable. Though there are two known
communities, researchers tend to detect anywhere from three to five groups in this data
set [86-88],

Figure 4.6: Books on U.S. politics: known structure as discovered by our method
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Figure 4.7: Books on U.S. politics degree distribution
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4.6 Results
In this section, we present our results along with a host of others - as published by
researchers for the same data set. We test our algorithm on the three data sets mentioned
in the prior section and an additional data set - American college football. Further, we use
Equation 4.4 to measure the strength of community structures - as detected by our method
on these data sets.
In [78], the authors state that in practice modularity values “typically fall in the
range from about 0.3 to 0.7.” We obtain the following modularity values for 3 datasets:
Zachary’s Karate Network [79] - Q - 0.3715, bottlenose dolphin network [80] - Q = 0.3735,
and books about U.S. politics [81] - Q = 0.4492. In each case, our algorithm consistently
classifies nodes into communities which coincide with their respective known structures.
Table 4.3 shows our method’s time complexity for each o f these data sets according to
Equation 4.5. Notice that our method executes in linear time for each data set. For the

Table 4.3: Our m ethod’s time complexity for each data set

Karate
Dolphins
Books

k

w

T{n)

2
3
3

3
1
1

An + 6 log 3 + £?<*«■+ 9 = O(n)
5 n + dl + 3 = 0 ( n )
5 n + di + 3 — 0 ( n )

fourth data set, American college football, we receive a Q value which indicates strong
community structure - Q = 0.4592. However, our algorithm only detects four communities
- where the number of known communities, for this data set, ranges anywhere from eight
to 12. Figure 4.8 provides a possible explanation. The histogram for this data set is the
complete opposite from what we have seen in the other cases. Nodes with high degrees are
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the majority. They appear with great frequency, while the nodes with low degrees appear
with great infrequency. Despite this, the Q value we obtain is consistent with those reported
by other researchers.

D eg r e e Distribution

N o d e D eg r e e

Figure 4.8: American college football degree distribution

We present the properties for each data set and the community attributes as detected
by our method and previously published methods in Table 4.4. Dashes in the table mean
that we were unable to obtain the designated information for a given method. Cm in column
two is the number of known communities for each data set; and # Cm Detected in column
five is the number of communities detected by each method. Notice that communities
detected by different methods may or may not coincide with the known number of com m u
nities.

Table 4.4: Data set properties and community attributes as detected by our method and previously published methods.
Data Set

# Nodes, Edges, Cm

Method in Paper

Apriori?

# Cm Detected

Q

34, 78, 2

SP betweenness [78J
Random Walks [92]
Greedy Heuristic [this work]
Mod Maximization [93]
Label Propagation [86]
Extreme Optimization [94]
Eigenvector-based [95]
Mod Maximization [87]
Greedy Heuristic [this work]
Genetic Algorithm [88]
Genetic Algorithm [89]
SP betweenness [78]
Label Propagation [86]
Mod maximization [87]
Greedy Heuristic [this work]
Fast Algorithm [69]
Genetic Algorithm [88]
Label Propagation [86]
Mod maximization [87]
Greedy Heuristic [this work]
Genetic Algorithm [88]
Mod maximization [93]
Genetic Algorithm [89]
Label Propagation [86]
Mod maximization [87]

Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
-

2
2
2
2
4
4
2
4
2
5
4
6
10

0.3500
0.3710
0.3715
0.3810
0.4180
0.4188
0.4190
0.4200
0.3735
0.5050
0.5070
0.5200
0.5230
0.5290
0.4492
0.5020
0.5180
0.5270
0.5272
0.4592
0.5150
0.5460
0.5770
0.6040
0.6460

Zachary’s Karate Club

62. 159,2
Bottlenose Dolphin

105, 441,2
Books on U.S. Politics

115, 663,8-12

American College Football
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Although we present our results alongside that of others, there are subtle differences
which limit direct comparison. Two things should be noted. One, some o f the Q values
reported by other researchers are the results of averages or rounding, whereas the values we
present are not. Our method is deterministic in nature. Therefore, multiple runs consistently
yield the same results. Two, some of the methods require apriori information, whereas
ours does not. Our method only uses the network structure, i.e., the adjacency matrix,
as a guide. The common trend observed throughout literature is to generically compare Q
values - with the basic assumption that a greater Q value denotes a more effective algorithm.
We maintain that this type of brute force comparison can be slightly misleading - as more
information may be needed. For instance, for the American college football network our
method detected the four communities and obtained Q = 0.4592. How does this compare to
an apriori method which detected less than the known number of communities it was given,
but received a higher (averaged/rounded) Q value? Perhaps, the solution is to compare
like methods - a priori with apriori methods and non-apriori with non-apriori methods.
However, this is no easy task. Rarely do researchers clearly state how well the communities
their method detected coincides with the known com munity structures - let alone whether
their method require apriori information. This just goes to show the convoluted nature of
establishing and executing a fair, direct, thorough result comparison.
The bottlenose dolphin network contains biggest disparity between the results we
present and those reported by others. This is due to the fact that our method exactly detected
the two known community structures, and the others most likely detected four communities.
For instance, in [78], Newman and Girvan detect four groups and report Q = 0.52 ± 0.03;
but they also give the Q value for the two known communities - Q = 0.38 ± 0.08. The latter
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coincides with the results we receive. Further, the fact that all other researchers received
Q values in the range of the former, leads us to conclude that their methods detected four
groups as well - though not explicitly stated.
Another thing to note is that the modularity maximization method, proposed by
authors in [87J, yields the highest Q value for each data set. This is not happenstance - as
the goal of the technique is to do just as its name suggests - find the community structures
which maximize modularity for a given data set. This is done in hopes that the resulting
group structures closely coincide with the known group structures. In [87], the number
of community structures which maximized modularity is as follows: Zachary’s karate club,
four, where the known number is two; books on U.S. politics, five, where the known number
is two-three; bottlenose dolphin network - number not reported; American college football,
10, where the known number is eight-12. The authors also report the Q value found by
their method for the known structures of Zachary’s karate club. They state, “the bipartition
found by the VP method has a modularity of 0.3718, whereas the partition corresponding
to the actual factions in the club has a lower modularity of 0.3715.” Please note that this
exactly coincides with the Q value we obtain using our method for this data set - Q = 0.3715.
The authors go on to assert that the higher modularity value, “explains the misclassification
of node 10, and also emphasizes that no clustering objective can be guaranteed to always
recover the semantically correct community structure in a real network. The latter should
be taken as a cautioning against accepting modularity-maximizing clusterings as ground
truth.” Thus, a higher Q value does not always mean a better method for detecting known
group structures, it simply may be the result of misclassifications.
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4.7 Discussion
Given that our method implements the objective (without regard for the constraint
first), then adheres to the constraint after, some nodes end up displaced. The nature of
the constraint itself is the reason we do this. It requires that nodes belong to the same
community as the majority of their peers. Instead of deriving techniques to tackle the con
straint directly (from the beginning), we assume that this implicitly mandates some basic
pre-existing community structure - for once communities have already been established,
this becomes a rudimentary exercise, i.e, it is easy to find where your friends are if they
already are grouped together. It turns out that our oblivious bandwagoning technique is
an effective way to establish basic community structures. In the cases w e’ve seen, this
alone defaultly places the majority of nodes in same communities as that of their peers.
There may be a few exceptions. By actively invoking the majority rules constraint, we
identify and resolve these exceptions. The process o f exception resolution cannot be done
haphazardly or it may lead the a misclassification ripple effect. Therefore, we derive a
way to prioritize node changes to minimize the chance of this occurring. We present two
examples we encountered while validating our algorithm. One deals with misclassification
ripple effect; and the other deals with continual refreshing for deadlocked nodes. We also
discuss measures we took to avoid local convergence.

4.7.1 Misclassification Ripple Effect
As mentioned earlier, some community detection algorithms tend to misplace a
node for the Zachary’s karate club data set: either node 3 or node 10. Depending on how
community structures are defined, both of these nodes could end up deadlocked. Since our
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method handles this case by implementing the objective only, we did not have a problem
classifying node 10. It joined the community with the highest degree - and that coincided
with the correct classification.

However, after exercising oblivious bandwagoning, we

noticed that three nodes were displaced - nodes 3, 14, and 20 (as shown in Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9: The lack of prioritization may lead to misclassification ripple effect.

Further, we found that implementing majority rules in a haphazard fashion did not
remedy the situation. Initially, the exception resolution happened by node ID in ascending
order. So node 3 would invoke majority rules, then node 14, then node 20. W hat we
noticed was a misclassification ripple effect - nodes initially misclassified via oblivious
bandwagoning tend to propagate misclassification if resolved haphazardly. As shown in
Figure 4.9, node 3 is connected to node 14; and node 14 is misclassified. Tf node 3 invokes
majority rules first, it will end up deadlocked. In this case, it would join the community
with the highest degree - which, in this case, would be the wrong classification. Node 14
and node 20, on the other hand, can be resolved without issues - majority rules works just
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fine for these nodes. Thus, leaving things unaltered, we would end up with the same result
as other researchers - one misclassification - node 3. The correct thing to do would be to
resolve node 14 before node 3. In order to do this, we came up with a way to prioritize
node changes based on the ratio of the number o f majority peers belonging to a single
community to the total number of peers. This way, those nodes who do not in deadlock
always invoke majority rules first. This is done in hopes to break the tie of a deadlocked
node. Following this, node 20 changes first - its ratio is 2 /3 . Node 14 goes next. Even
though, node 3 is misclassified its ratio is 3/5. Then, with a 1/2 ratio, node 20 goes last.

4.7.2 Continual Refreshing for Deadlocked Nodes
For the bottlenose dolphin network, we initially ended up with one misclassification,
and this was due to the lack of continual refreshing. As shown in Figure 4.10, node 40 is
deadlocked. Our rules state that node 40 should go to the hub with the highest connections.
Since node 58 had a higher degree than node 37, node 40 joined node 58 or the hub node
58 belonged to. Though it took time to propagate the changes, node 37 ultimate joined
the hub associated with node 15. At this moment, node 40 was supposed to switch to the
hub associated with node 37, because it had a higher number of connections than the hub
associated with node 58; but this did not happen because node 40 did not observe both its
peers after the initial observation. It joined node 58 and did whatever it (node 58) did. To
resolve this, we simply created a rule to enforce continual refreshing. Nodes involved in
deadlock should continuously observe peers to avoid potential misclassifications.
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4.7.3 Avoiding Local Convergence
Initially, for the bottlenose dolphin network, we received the same results as those
presented in [78]: four communities. Each community centered around four highly con
nected nodes - nodes 15, 46, 18, and 58. As shown in Figure 4.10, nodes 15 and 46 are
subgroups which combine to form a larger community on the left half. The same goes for
nodes 18 and 58 on the right half. To avoid local subgroup convergence, we added the rule
that nodes which declare themselves as hubs should periodically observe their peers and
join the hub associated with the majority o f their peers. This ultimately resulted in two
groups centered around nodes 15 and 18.

Figure 4.10: A misclassified node due to the lack of continual refreshing.

4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we framed community detection as a node to hub assignment prob
lem and developed a greedy heuristic which exploits the scale-free nature of social networks
to solve this problem. Our heuristic is practical, easy to implement, and deterministic.
Further, it discovers community structures without the need of a priori information, i.e.,
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threshold values, community size restrictions, or the desired number o f communities. The
results are promising - as our method, in some cases, outperforms apriori algorithms when
tested on the same data set. This tends to give credence to our initial hypothesis that hubs
play a key role in community discovery.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The work contained in this dissertation sought to use power-law properties of social
groups to answer two research questions.
1. From an insider’s perspective, in what ways do communities emerge? That is, what
internal processes have to occur on the micro-level to have group formation emerge
on the macro-scale? Can mussels and Levy walks be used to describe these pro
cesses? How can this type of behavior be used as a defense strategy?
2. From an outsider’s perspective, how to detect communities once they have formed?
Given each individual’s local connections only, is it possible to classify individuals
into their respective known global communities? How can the scale-free properties
of social networks help shed light on this problem?

To address the first research question, we presented a defense strategy, in part
inspired by mussel self-organization, to address a security concern in cloud systems. The
strategy obfuscated public to private IP mapping by having account proxies perform 1 —to

il random mapping of public to private IP addresses. This decreased the risk of adversary
targeting and significantly reduced the amount of public IP addresses needed for users to
access their VM instances. By having clusters periodically dissolve, our strategy decreased

86

87

the chances of directed attacks towards random users belonging to a particular account
proxy.
To address the second research question, we used the scale-free properties of social
networks to develop a greedy heuristic for community detection. We hypothesized that
highly connected nodes, or hubs, formed the basic building blocks of communities; and
assumed that each community had one global hub, and that nodes with lower degrees
preferentially attached to hubs in their vicinity. We developed an algorithm based on this
notion and tested it on commonly used real network data sets. In most cases, it classified
nodes into communities which coincided with their respective known structures. Unlike
other implementations, it did not required apriori information and detected communities in
a computationally inexpensive and deterministic manner.
As for future directions, we look to: integrate the mussel algorithm as a functional
part of the cloud and observe how well it performs in practice; conduct more extensive
tests and use the community detection algorithm on large network data sets; and find other
problem domains where the mussel algorithm will prove useful.
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